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The Transformoney Tree at the 2012 Burning Man Festival in the Black Rock Desert in 
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An important role of banks is to screen and monitor borrowers on behalf of their 
depositors (Diamond, 1984). It would be very costly if every depositor, like you and me, 
has to review 10 credit applications on a weekly basis. Banks specialize in extracting and 
processing information concerning borrowers through their close relationship with them 
and in a way that is not replicable by individual depositors. Therefore, one of the main 
tasks of a bank is to collect and process information.   
Banks collect and process information in various ways. For example, a bank could 
only use the financial records of a firm to make a lending decision. This quantitative 
numerical information is often labeled as ‘hard information’. In contrast, a bank could 
talk with the entrepreneur to collect so called ‘soft information’ about the firm, such as a 
judgment about the managerial qualities of the entrepreneur. The way how banks collect 
and process information is important, because it affects the lending decisions of the bank 
and the terms of the credit contract. 
 This dissertation studies how banks collect and process information. The first 
chapter studies how the organizational structure of a bank affects the processing of 
information. The second chapter studies how a bank uses information collected over the 
lending relationship in credit negotiations. The last chapter is joint work with Hans 
Degryse, Jose Liberti and Steven Ongena and studies how a bank uses ‘soft information’ 
to monitor small firms. To answer these questions this dissertation uses hand collected 
internal bank data. The internal bank data opens the black box how banks communicate 
internally, negotiate and monitor small firms.  
 The first chapter investigates whether the organizational structure of a bank 
affects the incentives of loan officers to manipulate information. Banks have different 
organizational structures. There are very large banks, such as HSBC, Deutsche Bank and 
ING Bank, and very small community banks with just a few branches. Economic theory 
predicts that the structure of an organization affects the way how people communicate. 
One specific prediction is that the delegation of decision making authority reduces 
incentives to manipulate information (Dessein, 2002). To test this prediction, Chapter 1 





manipulate information by using multiple scoring trials to change information to make 
the credit application look better. The chapter firstly shows that loan officers manipulate 
information to increase the likelihood of a credit approval and are more likely to 
manipulate information of credit applications with a large new credit volume and non-
lending product sales, which reflects the structure of their compensation. Subsequently, 
the chapter shows that the delegation of decision making authority to their superior 
decreases their incentives to manipulate information. Their superior has a similar 
compensation structure and is more likely to approve credit applications with non-lending 
product sales, which shows that the delegation of decision making authority is associated 
with a loss of control. 
 Banks could use the private information which they collect over the lending 
relationship in credit negotiations. For example, a bank could charge a successful firm the 
average market interest rate, which also other banks charge, even though the bank knows 
that the prospects of the firm are better than average. As a result, the bank makes profit 
because the bank has better information about the firm than other banks which do not 
lend to the firm. According to this intuition, the information collected over the lending 
relationship could give banks bargaining power in credit negotiations (Rajan, 1992).  
 Chapter 2 studies how a large commercial bank negotiates with small firms and is 
the first empirical study on the bargaining process in the credit market. The chapter 
shows that in a typical credit negotiation the firm and the bank firstly sets the collateral 
requirements, then the non-interest credit terms of the credit lines and term loans and 
finally the interest rates and fees. Subsequently, the chapter shows that bank extracts rents 
in the first offer from relationships and opaque firms and these firms are less likely to 
negotiate interest rate concessions, which suggests that informational frictions in the 
credit market give banks bargaining power. Finally, the chapter shows that negotiating 
pays off. Negotiating firms pay a 33 basis points lower interest rate than otherwise similar 
firms which accept the first offer. 
Chapter 3 studies how a bank uses ‘soft information' in lending decisions. We 
show that the collection of ‘soft information’ and the exercising of loan officer discretion 





loan amounts from the amounts stemming from the bank’s own credit scoring model. 
Soft information guides discretion, and helps in predicting loan default even when 
controlling for all available public and private information. Loan officers use soft 
information when deciding on the loan amount that is being granted: A one standard 
deviation of more favourable ‘soft information’ results in the granting of a 16 percent 
higher loan amount. Beyond using soft information, loan officer discretion per se neither 
improves nor deteriorates loan outcomes. 
The main contribution of the dissertation to the literature is twofold. First, the first 
chapter shows that the organizational structure of a bank affects the incentives of loan 
officers to manipulate information. Second, chapter 2 and 3 show that the private 
information which banks collect over the banking relationship affects the bargaining 
behaviour in credit negotiations and discretionary lending decisions of loan officers, as 












I  Delegation of Authority and Information 














This paper exploits an organizational change in a large commercial bank to investigate 
how delegation of authority affects loan officers’ incentives to manipulate information. 
Loan officers manipulate information to increase the likelihood of a credit approval and 
are more likely to manipulate information of credit applications with a large new credit 
volume and non-lending product sales, which reflects the structure of their compensation. 
The delegation of approval authority to their superior decreases their incentives to 
manipulate information. However, their superior has a similar compensation structure and 
is more likely to approve credit applications with non-lending product sales, which shows 

















The task of collecting information and decision making is often separated in large 
organizations. For example, in a bank, loan officers collect information about credit 
applicants, while their superiors often make the credit approval decisions. Agents can 
strategically communicate their private information by changing or withholding some of 
their information to affect the outcomes of the decision making process. Agents will 
manipulate their information if their objectives are not perfectly aligned with those of the 
principal (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). The delegation of authority fosters communication 
compared to the case where the principle is in charge, but results simultaneously in a loss 
of control (Dessein, 2002; Harris and Raviv, 2005; Marino and Matsusaka, 2005).   
 This paper exploits an organizational change in a large commercial bank to 
investigate how delegation of authority affects loan officers’ incentives to manipulate 
information. The paper finds that the delegation of authority to the superior of the loan 
officer decreases their incentives to manipulate information. However, their superior is 
more likely to approve credit applications with non-lending products sales than an 
approval decision made before the delegation of authority, which shows that the 
delegation of authority is associated with a loss of control. 
Small business lending is well suited for an inquiry into the effect of 
organizational structure on information manipulation. First, the task of collecting 
information about credit applicants and the approval of credit applications is often 
separated in commercial banks. In addition, the objectives of loan officers and the 
approval authority might differ due to the remuneration structure and soft, non-verifiable 
information is important in small business lending (Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and 
Stein, 2005). These three ingredients enable agents to strategically transmit information 





software which records the information used in credit decisions.
 1
 This allows to study the 
loan approval process and the exchange of information between the loan officer and the 
approval authority, while in other industries the exchange of information remains 
unrecorded. 
 To test the impact of the delegation of authority on information manipulation this 
paper exploits an organizational change in the approval process of small business loans in 
a large commercial bank in the Netherlands. In October 2010, the bank changed its 
approval process and delegated the authority to approve small business loans from risk 
management to local business directors. The main difference between a risk manager and 
a business director is that the lending volume and non-lending product sales affect the 
remuneration of the local business director, but not the remuneration of a risk manager. 
Loan officers have a similar compensation package as the business director. Their 
objectives are therefore more similar to the objectives of the business director than the 
objectives of the risk manager. The bank delegated the authority to approve credit 
applications to the business directors of the branches, except for a group of branches 
which is used as control group.
2
   
The data employed in this paper contain more than 23,000 credit applications over 
the period January 2009 to March 2011 and include information about the exchange of 
information between the loan officer and the approval authority. This paper uses the 
approach of Berg, Puri and Rocholl (2013) to measure information manipulation. They 
show that loan officers use multiple scoring trials to adjust the input parameters of the 
risk management software to improve the approval score of the credit applications if the 
first trial is below an automatic approval cut-off. The bank in this paper uses similar risk 
management software and the paper uses the number of scoring trials as information 
manipulation measure. This paper shows empirically that loan officers are more likely to 
                                                 
1
 Liberti and Mian (2009) and Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) provide examples of the hierarchical approval 
process in two US banks. Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) and Berg, Puri and Rocholl (2013) describe the 
use of risk management software in a U.S. and German bank.  
2
 The branches in the control group were part of a mandatory divestment. The European Commission 
forced the bank to sell some of their branches to a competing bank. During the transition period these 
branches operated independently and were not subject to the organizational change. In all other aspects the 





use multiple trials if the applying firm purchases non-lending products and the credit 




Using a difference-in-difference methodology this paper tests the hypothesis of 
Dessein (2002) that the delegation of authority reduces incentives to manipulate 
information. The paper finds that loan officers use fewer scoring trials if their business 
director makes the approval decision instead of a risk manager. In addition, the paper 
shows that the likelihood of an improvement of the approval score between the first and 
the final trial decreases if the business director approves the credit applications. The 
delegation of authority only affects the loan officers’ incentives to manipulate 
information if the objectives of their business director are more similar to their objectives 
than the objectives of the risk manager. To test this prediction the paper examines 
whether business directors make different approval decisions than risk managers if they 
face a similar credit application. The results show that business directors make a different 
credit decision than risk managers if a firm purchases non-lending products. This 
suggests that the objectives of the business director are similar to the objectives of the 
loan officers.  
 The main contribution of this paper is to provide novel evidence on information 
manipulation and the effects of organizational design on the agent’s incentives to 
manipulate information. The paper is related to the organizational economics literature 
examining the effect of organizational structure on the use of information and decision 
making.
4
 Studies by Liberti, (2005), Agarwal and Hauswald (2010), and Qian, Strahan 
and Yang (2012) find that the delegation of authority and greater autonomy improves the 
incentives of loan officers to exert effort and collect soft information. In contrast, this 
                                                 
3
 The paper also shows that loan officers use more scoring trials if the first approval score indicates a low 
probability of approval and that loan officers are more likely to improve the approval score over the scoring 
trials than downgrading the score. Both findings provide additional evidence of information manipulation 
and are in line with the findings of Berg, Puri and Rocholl (2013). The current version of the data does not 
include loan performance data which would enable to test whether multiple trials predict default. 
4
 In contrast, Liberti, Seru, and Vig (2012) study the impact of a change in the informational environment 





study focuses on the effects of delegation on information manipulation.
5
 Liberti and Mian 
(2009) show that a greater hierarchical and geographical distance leads to less reliance on 
soft information, but do not test whether this effect is due to the problem of information 
manipulation.  
 This paper uses a direct measure of information manipulation using the approach 
of Berg, Puri and Rocholl (2013). An important difference is that this study examines the 
effect of the delegation of authority on information manipulation and therefore directly 
tests the prediction of Dessein (2002).  In addition, the loan officers in Berg, Puri and 
Rocholl (2013) only manipulate information in the bank’s risk management software, 
while in this paper information manipulation affects real decision making. This paper 
shows that the delegation of authority could reduce communication problems. Related, 
Hertzberg, Liberti and Paravisini (2010) show that a loan officer rotation policy could 
mitigate agency problems in communication. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the approval 
process and the organizational change. Section 3 describes the sample, the information 
manipulation measures and presents the descriptive statistics. Section 4 examines the 
determinants of information manipulation and section 5 investigates the effect of the 
delegation of authority on information manipulation. Section 6 investigates the effect of 




                                                 
5
 Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein (2005) find that large banks are less willing to provide credit to 





2. The credit application process and the organizational change  
The data provider is one of the top five commercial banks in the Netherlands and its 
business practices, information acquisition and loan data are highly representative for the 
banking industry. The business banking division of the bank provides credit lines, term 
loans and non-lending products to small and medium enterprises. This division consists 
of over hundred business branches, covering all provinces in the Netherlands. A branch 
has one business director and a team of 10 to 20 loan officers. The business director is in 
charge of general business development and monitors, coordinates and helps the loan 
officers in their work. The loan officers meet prospective clients, handle credit 
applications and are in charge of developing the firm-bank relationship. The bank has 
also 4 regional risk management offices with 15 to 20 risk managers. The responsibility 
of risk mangers is to approve the credit applications in their region.  
 The structure of the compensation package of the loan officer is similar to the 
compensation package of the business director. The remuneration of the loan officers and 
the business directors consists of a fixed salary and performance based remuneration 
based on the risk weighted interest income and the non-interest income generated by their 
portfolio. The performance based remunerations is about 5 to 10 percent of the total fixed 
salary. In contrast, the performance based remuneration of the risk managers is based on 
the number of decisions they make, independent of the outcome of the decision. The 
difference in the remuneration packages of the loan officers and risk managers gives rise 
to a bias in the objective of the loan officer and the risk manager, which is one of the 
main assumptions of the communication models of  Crawford and Sobel, (1982), Dessein 
(2002), Harris and Raviv (2005) and Marino and Matsusaka (2005).   
 
2.1 The approval process 
The approval process proceeds in the following way. First, the firm meets with a loan 
officer and discusses its business, credit demand and collateral. The firm provides 
information such as recent annual reports, forecasts and taxation reports. The loan officer 
enters all the firm data into the bank’s risk management software and specifies the 





loan officer could only proceed to the next step, the scoring of the application, once the 
credit application is complete.  
Second, the loan officer ‘scores’ the credit application. The bank uses a credit 
scoring technology and an algorithm which determines whether an application needs an 
approval.
6
 The algorithm, whose decision parameters are set by the headquarters, 
determines the approval score, which could be green, orange or red.
7
 The main decision 
parameters of the algorithm include the firm’s credit rating, the collateral ratio and a 
credit policy score based on over 40 credit policy questions about the credit application.
8
 
The approval score allocates the approval authority of the credit application. Credit 
applications with a green approval score are automatically approved by the system. Credit 
applications with an orange and red approval score require an approval from risk 
management.
9
 After the scoring a colleague of the loan officer checks the correctness of 
the hard information in the credit application and a senior loan officer or the business 
director gives permission to submit the credit application for approval.     
Third, the risk manager evaluates the credit application with a red or orange 
approval score and ultimately decides whether to approve or reject the credit application. 
The risk manager uses the information about the firm, the credit application and 
additional notes of the loan officer in the risk management software to make its decision 
and has no direct contact with the firm. Therefore, its decision relies completely on the 
information provided by the loan officer. Although the bank checks the correctness of the 
hard information in the credit application there are many fields in the credit application 
which are not verifiable. For example, the loan officer has to give a written motivation for 
                                                 
6
 Credit scoring technologies are widely applied in small business lending in the U.S. and Europe 
(Akhavein, Frame, and White, 2005). 
7
 This system is similar to the credit approval system described in Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) and Berg, 
Puri and Rocholl (2013). Specialized firms, such as TCI Loan origination solutions, Lenders Logic and 
Global Wave Banking Solutions offer similar specialized software packages to commercial banks for loan 
origination, workflow, approval and monitoring of commercial loans. 
8
 The firm’s credit rating is based on more than 20 parameters. The credit policy questions include 
questions about the financial position and reputation of the owner, the nature of the credit demand and the 
quality of the collateral. 
9
 A risk manager in a regional approval office makes the approval decision for credit applications with an 






the credit applications. After the approval of the credit application, the loan officer could 
prepare the credit offer and send the offer to the firm.  
 
2.2 The organizational change  
In October 2010, the bank changed its approval process and delegated the authority to 
approve credit applications from risk management to the business directors of the   
branches. The bank delegated authority because of the implementation of the “three lines 
of defense” risk management strategy. An essential element of this strategy is that the 
business instead of the back office (e.g. risk management) becomes responsible for risk 
taking.
10
 The “three lines of defense” risk management strategy was implemented bank 
wide and was not specific to the small business lending division or driven by the 
performance of this division. In addition, the implementation of this strategy was also not 
specifically implemented by this bank. Several large banks implemented this strategy and 
large auditing firms offered consultancy services to implement this strategy. However, 
the implementation of is “three lines of defense” strategy was not forced by the 
regulator.
11
 The paper discusses this organizational change in detail below. From this 
point forward, the original setting is referred to as before the change and the setting after 
the delegation of authority as after the change.  
The delegation of the approval authority affected all branches, except for the 
branches which were part of a mandatory divestment, which the paper uses as control 
group. Figure 1 shows the timeline of the divestment of the branches and the delegation 
of authority. The European Commission forced the bank in 2007, before the crisis, to sell 
some of their branches to a competing bank. The bank selected the branches and the 
branches operated after the selection independently as a subsidiary of the bank. In 2008, 
the bank signed an agreement to sell the branches to another large European bank. The 
transfer of the shares took place in the beginning of 2010. After the official divestment 
                                                 
10
 In this model, the first line of defense is the business itself and the other two lines risk management and 
the internal and external audit. One key element of the risk management strategy is that the business takes 
full responsibility for the risks that arise in their operations. To give this responsibility, risk management 
delegated the authority to approve credit applications to local business directors.   
11
 For example, Ernst and Young issued a white paper to advice banks how to implement the “Three Lines 





the divested branches operated as independent subsidiary of the new owner and continued 
to use the same lending software, but were not subject to the organizational change. The 
empirical section compares in detail the treated and control branches before and after the 
change and uses the divestment date for a placebo test. 
The remaining part of this section describes in detailed how the bank implemented 
the organizational change and how it affected the approval process. Figure 1 shows the 
organizational structure of the credit approval process of the treated and control branches 
before and after the organizational change.
12
 Before the change risk managers approved 
credit applications with an orange or red approval score. The business directors gave the 
loan officer permission to submit the credit offer for approval, but did not make the final 
approval decision. After the change, the bank delegated the authority to approve credit 
applications with a green or orange approval score to the business directors of the treated 
branches. The organizational structure of the control branches did not change and risk 
managers continued to make the approval decision.   
Both the treated and control branches continued to use the risk management 
software to approve credit applications. Business directors evaluate the credit application 
in a similar way as a risk manager and could only approve the credit application via the 
risk management system. The algorithm to determine the approval score did change over 
time and became stricter around the time of the change, but changes in the algorithm 
affected both the treated and control branches.  
The remuneration package of the loan officers of the treated and control branches 
did not change after the organizational change. However, after the organizational change, 
the bank included a performance measure for the credit quality in the compensation 
package of the business directors of the treated branches. This change in the remuneration 
package of the business director is in line with the predictions of Dessein (2002). Dessein 
(2002) predicts that it is optimal for the principal to delegate authority to an intermediary 
if the principal “could freely choose an intermediary’s level of bias” and the total bias of 
                                                 
12
 Liberti (2005) studies a similar hierarchical change. The bank in his study fully delegated authority to 
senior loan officers and partially delegated authority by redefining team roles. However, his study focuses 
on the effect of delegation on the incentives of loan officers to exert effort, while this paper focuses on the 





the agent is not very large. Therefore, the delegation of authority from risk management 
to the business directors reduces the bias in objectives between the information collecting 
agent (the loan officer) and the approval authority. 
Risk managers make their credit approval decision based on the firm specific 
information collected by the loan officer and do not collect firm specific information 
themselves. Their firm specific information set is a subset of the information set of the 
loan officer. Business directors do not collect firm specific information either. However 
they do possibly know the firm or the owners.   
 
3. Data 
3.1 The sample  
The sample consists of 23,013 credit applications of small firms over the period January 
2009 to March 2011.
 
A branch handles on average 130 new credit applications from 
small and medium sized firms a year. These credit applications are applications for new 
credit and do not include renewals or renegotiations of existing loans. 
The firms applying for credit are small and medium sized firms, such as farms, 
wholesalers, construction firms, architect bureaus and medical practices. The firms have a 
mean total asset size of 635 thousand euro and a mean turnover of 978 thousand euro.
13
 
In 48 percent of the credit applications the firm has an existing lending relationship with 
the bank and in 44 percent of the credit applications the firm also purchases non-lending 
products, such as cash management, foreign exchange and insurance products.
14
 The 
average new credit volume of a credit application is 191 thousand euro. The firms apply 
for new credit to finance working capital and to finance fixed assets, such as real estate, 
machines and other equipment. The collateral ratio of the credit applications is 78 percent 
and the pledged collateral consists of corporate real estate, inventories, account 
                                                 
13
 The firms are comparable with small U.S. firms covered by the 2003 National Survey of Small Business 
Finance (NSSBF). The median firm in the NSSBF survey has an asset size between 100 and 240 thousand 
dollar and employs five to nine employees (Mach and Wolken, 2006). 
14
 The data contains no details about the number of non-lending products. Santikian (2010) shows that U.S. 
firms purchase on average 10 non-lending products. The firms in her sample, however, are significantly 





receivables and personal guarantees. An average credit application consists of one credit 
line and one term loan and has an average maturity of 6 years.  
Table I compares the summary statistics of the treated and control branches for 
the full sample. The average firm size is slightly smaller for the treated branches, but the 
leverage and credit rating of the firms applying for credit is fairly similar. In both the 
treatment and control branches about 50 percent of the firms have an existing lending 
relationship and 30 percent of the firms have debt from other banks. The treated branches 
are more likely to sell non-lending products than the control branches.
15
 The size of the 
new credit volume is similar, but the collateral ratio of the treated branches is lower and 
the maturity about 6 months longer. Overall, there are no large differences between the 
firms and the credit applications of the treated and control branches.     
 
3.2 Measuring information manipulation 
In the application process the loan officer uses the algorithm to ‘score’ a credit 
application and then chooses based on the outcome how to proceed. The loan officer 
could abort the credit application, submit the application for approval or change any of 
the input parameters and initiate a new scoring trial. This enables the loan officer to 
manipulate the information in order to affect the outcome of the algorithm. For example 
the outcome could change from ‘red’ to ‘orange’ after several trials. The risk 
management software of the bank records each trial, but loan officers are in general not 
aware that all scoring trials are recorded and also the bank’s risk management department 
has not used it so far.  
The paper uses the methodology of Berg, Puri and Rocholl (2013) to measure 
information manipulation. They use data from a large German bank and measure the 
number of trials the loan officer uses to score consumer loan applications. They show that 
loan officers use significantly more trials around the automatic rejection cut-off in the 
bank’s algorithm. Multiple scoring trials for a single credit application can be due to loan 
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 The non-interest income from non-lending product sales is observable in a due diligence by any potential 
buyer. Therefore it is unlikely that the competing bank bought underperforming branches without knowing 






officers honestly correcting false information from a former trial (the information 
correction hypothesis) or loan officers manipulate the information they have about their 
customers in order to increase the likelihood of an approval of their application. To 
distinguish between these two interpretations Berg, Puri and Rocholl (2013) estimate the 
effect of multiple scoring trials on the default rate of consumer loans and show that 
additional trials positively predict default, suggesting that loan officers manipulate 
information around the cut-off.  
The data of this paper includes the number of scoring trials of each credit 
application and the main input parameters and outcomes of each trial, which enables to 
measure the adjustments between the first and last trial.  Table II shows that loan officers 
use on average 10 scoring trials per credit application. This is significantly higher than 
the average of 2 scoring trials reported in Berg, Puri and Rocholl (2013). A difference in 
the number of input parameters in the algorithm is a plausible explanation for this 
difference. The algorithm of the bank in Berg, Puri and Rocholl (2013) is designed for 
consumer loans and is based on 5 main input parameters while the algorithm of the bank 
in this paper is designed for small business lending and is based on over 30 parameters 
and more than 40 credit policy questions. This could reflect the difference in complexity 
in the information and contractual structure between consumer and small business 
lending.  
During the scoring trials loan officers can change the parameters of the scoring 
model to improve the approval score. For 15 percent of all credit applications the final 
approval score is better than the first approval score, while only for 4 percent of the credit 
applications the final approval score is worse than the first approval score. The fact that 
the approval score improves more frequently than deteriorates can be seen as a first 
indication that loan officer manipulate information instead of honestly correcting false 
information from a former trial. Table II presents the descriptive statistics for each first 
approval score (green, orange, or red). The results show that loan officers make more 
scoring trials if the first approval score is red and more importantly, the approval score 
improves for 40 percent of these red scored applications. In contrast, a decrease in the 





descriptive statistic suggests that loan officers use scoring trials to improve the approval 
score of the credit application.  The next section investigates the determinants of the 
scoring trials and the improvements of the approval score.  
 
4. Determinants of information manipulation 
An important empirical prediction of Crawford and Sobel (1982) is that agents 
manipulate information if the objectives of the principal and the agent are less similar. 
The paper uses the differences in the compensation packages of the loan officer and the 
risk manager to create empirical proxies which capture the differences in objectives 
between the loan officer and the risk manager. An important difference between the 
compensation package of a loan officer and a risk manager is that loan officers have a 
volume-based compensation and are compensated for the generated non-interest income, 
while the compensation packages of risk managers do not include these incentives. 
Agarwal and Ben-David (2012) show that a change from a fixed salary to a volume-based 
compensation affects the loan officer’s incentives and results in a higher approval rate, 
larger loan sizes and a higher default rate. Santikian (2012) shows that the sales of non-
lending products are important in small business lending. Based on the structure of the 
compensation packages of the bank and the empirical evidence from other banks, the 
expectation is that loan officers are more likely to manipulate information if the credit 
application is likely to get rejected (has a bad first approval score), has a large new credit 
volume and has additional sales of non-lending products. The paper tests this prediction 
by estimating the following specification: 
 
         Ln(                                             ,         (1) 
 
where the Ln(                     is the natural logarithm of the number of scoring 
trials of the credit application i at branch j by loan officer k at time t, and       is a matrix 
of explanatory variables,    are branch fixed effects,    are year-month fixed effects and 





first scoring trial (orange and red), firm characteristics (firm size, leverage and 
profitability), credit application characteristics (the natural logarithm of the new credit 
volume, the collateral ratio and the maturity) and relationship characteristics (lending 
relationship, lending from other banks, non-lending products). Standard errors are 
clustered at the branch level.
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Table III presents the empirical results and shows in column (1) that the outcomes 
of the first scoring trial and the sales of non-lending products are important determinants 
of the number of scoring trials. The number of scoring trials increases 17 percent if the 
first approval score is orange and 25 percent if the first approval score is red. These 
results are similar to Berg, Puri and Rocholl (2013), who find that a score worse than the 
automatic rejection cut-off in the first scoring trial is associated with 48 percent more 
scoring trials. The interpretation of these findings is that loan officers try to improve the 
approval score if the first approval score indicates that there is a high likelihood of a 
rejection of the application. By adjusting the first approval score, the credit application 
looks better, which increases the likelihood of an approval.   
 The paper finds that loan officers use 35 percent more scoring trials if firms 
purchase non-lending products. Loan officers are remunerated based on the non-interest 
income returns of their portfolio and put therefore more value on an approval of an 
application with potential sales of non-lending products. This is in line with the findings 
of Santikian (2012) that non-lending profits are an important driver of the credit terms of 
small business loans.
17
 In addition, the results show that loan officers use more scoring 
trials if the credit application has a larger new credit volume. An increase in the new 
credit volume from the median new credit volume of 50 thousand euro by one standard 
deviation (223 thousand euro) leads to an increase in the number of scoring trials by ( 
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 An alternative way to estimate this specification is to use a negative binomial regression. The results of a 
negative binomial regression are similar to the results of the log-linear model presented in this section. 
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 An alternative explanation of Santikian’s (2012) result is that non-lending products are important in 
lending decisions because they provide more information about the firm (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). 
However, additional information from non-lending products does not explain that loan officers use more 





223/50)∙ 0.059 = 26 percent.
18
 These results suggest that the incentives of the loan officer 
to sell more non-lending products and increase the size of its portfolio are positively 
correlated with the number of scoring trials. Loan officers use less scoring trials for 
existing lending relationships and more for firms with debt from other banks, but these 
factors only marginally affect the number of scoring trials. 
 Differences in loan officers’ career concerns and experience (loan officers have 
the same compensation package) could give them different incentives to manipulate 
information. To test this hypothesis the paper includes loan officer fixed effect to the 
specification and reports the results in column (2). The R-squared increases from 13 
percent to 27 percent, which suggests that unobserved loan officer characteristics are an 
important determinant of the number of scoring trials. The results also show that for the 
same loan officer the outcome of the first approval score, sales of non-lending products 
and credit applications with larger credit volumes with longer maturities are still an 
important determinant of the number of scoring trials.  
 Next, the paper estimates the likelihood of a better approval score using a probit 
model and reports the marginal effects in column (3). Since the paper only observes 
variation in the dependent variable if the first approval score is orange and red, the paper 
only includes a dummy which equals one if the first approval score is orange. The results 
show that the likelihood of a better approval score is 22 percentage points lower if the 
first approval score is orange.
19
  Sales of non-lending products increase the probability of 
a better approval with 2 percentage points, which is in line with the previous results in 
column (1) and (2). The paper does not find evidence that the credit volume affect the 
probability of a better approval score. One explanation for this result is that the credit 
volume is part of the approval algorithm and larger credit volumes result in a lower 
approval score. The paper also finds that loan officers use fewer trials and are less likely 
to improve the score for existing relationships, which is in line with Berg, Puri and 
Rocholl (2013). Overall, the evidence in Table III shows that the incentives of the loan 
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 Berg, Puri and Rocholl (2013) find a similar result that a one standard deviation increase of the loan size 
from the median increases the number of scoring trials with 11.9 percent. 
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officers explain the number of scoring trials and the likelihood that the approval score 
improves.  
In the next section the paper attempts to answer the question whether the 
delegation of authority affects the incentives of the loan officers to manipulate 
information.     
 
5. The delegation of authority and information manipulation 
Dessein (2002) predicts that the delegation of authority reduces the agent’s incentives to 
manipulate information. In order to investigate the effect of the delegation of authority on 
information manipulation by loan officers the paper estimates the following difference-
in-difference specification: 
 
                                                          
                                                                                                                     (2) 
 
where the Ln(                     is the natural logarithm of the number of scoring 
trials of credit application i at branch j by loan officer k at time t,          is a dummy 
variable which takes the value of one if the approval authority was delegated to the 
business director of branch j,        takes the value of one if the credit application was 
done after the delegation of authority,      is a matrix of control variables,    are branch 
fixed effects,    are year-month fixed effects and      is the error term. The matrix of 
control variables includes the outcomes of the first scoring trial (orange and red), firm 
characteristics (firm size, leverage and profitability), credit application characteristics (the 
natural logarithm of the new credit volume, the collateral ratio and the maturity) and 
relationship characteristics (lending relationship, lending from other banks, non-lending 
products). To address the problem of serially correlated outcomes in the differences-in-
differences estimation (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004) standard errors are 





 Table IV reports the estimated coefficients of specification (2). Column (1) shows 
that the delegation of authority does not reduce the number of scoring trials. This result 
could imply that the delegation of authority does not affect the incentives of loan officers 
to manipulate information, or that it only affects the incentives of loan officers for a 
particular group of credit applications. Panel B of Figure 1 shows that risk management 
still approves the credit applications with a red approval score after the change, while a 
business director instead of a risk manager approves the credit applications with an 
orange approval score. This implies for this group of applications that the loan officer 
asks his direct superior for an approval of the credit application. The expectation is that in 
particular for orange and green scored credit applications the loan officer has fewer 
incentives to adjust the approval score. To examine this prediction the paper tests whether 
loan officers in the treated   post branches are less likely to use multiple scoring trials if 
the outcome of the first scoring trial is green or orange. Column (2) shows that loan 
officers use less scoring trials after the delegation of authority, but relatively more trials if 
the first approval score is red. Loan officers have an incentive to manipulate information 
to be able to submit the credit application to their own business manager. This 
interpretation assumes that the objective of the loan officer and the business director are 
more similar than the objectives of the loan officer and the risk manager. The previous 
section shows that loan officer specific characteristics are an important determinant of the 
number of scoring trials. The paper now tests whether the same loan officer has fewer 
incentives to manipulate information if the credit application will be approved by his 
business director. The paper estimates specification (2) with loan officer fixed effects and 
reports the results in column (3). The same loan officer uses less scoring trials after the 
delegation of authority, but similar to the results in column (2) uses more scoring trials if 
the first approval score is red. This confirms that loan officers try to get an approval from 
their business director instead of a risk manager which approves the credit applications 
with a red approval score.  
 An alternative measure for information manipulation is the better approval score 
dummy which takes the value of one if the final approval score is better than the first 





decreases after the delegation of authority by estimating the likelihood of a better 
approval score with a probit model. Note that this specification only includes the orange 
dummy and the interaction term treated   post   orange. This is because the dependent 
variable only varies if the first approval score is orange or red (it is not possible to 
improve a green approval score). Column (4) reports the marginal effects. The paper 
finds that the likelihood of a better approval score decreases with 9 percentage points if 
the first score is orange and the business director has the approval authority. Instead of 
improving the approval score, loan officer can refrain from adjusting a too positive 
approval score. To test this hypothesis, the paper estimates the likelihood that the 
approval score worsens between the first trial and the final trial. Column (6) shows that 
the likelihood of a negative change if the first approval score is orange increase with 13 
percentage points after the delegation of authority. This result suggests that if their 
business director does not take the decisions loan officers add extra information to the 
credit application, which decreases the approval score.  
The results suggest that loan officers are less likely to manipulate information if 
the credit application will be approved by their business director instead of a risk 
manager. In the next section the paper examines whether business directors make 
different approval decisions than risk managers if they face a similar credit application. 
This would explain why loan officers have fewer incentives to manipulate information. 
 
6. The delegation of authority and the approval decision  
The previous section shows that the delegation of authority reduces the loan officers’ 
incentives to manipulate information. Economic theory, however, predicts that the 
delegation of authority comes with a loss of control (Dessein, 2002; Harris and Raviv, 
2005; Marino and Matsusaka, 2005). The paper examines this claim by testing whether 









The paper estimates the likelihood of a credit approval using the following specification:  
 
                                                   
                                           ,           (3) 
 
where                  is the likelihood of an approval of credit application i at the 
branch j by loan officer k at time t,          is a dummy variable which takes the value 
of one if the approval authority was delegated to the business director of branch j,        
takes the value of one if the credit application was done after the delegation of authority 
in October 2010,      is a matrix of control variables,    are branch fixed effects,    are 
year-month fixed effects.      is a standard normal cumulative distribution. The matrix 
of control variables includes the outcomes of the final scoring trial (orange and red), firm 
characteristics (firm size, leverage and profitability), credit application characteristics (the 
natural logarithm of the new credit volume, the collateral ratio and the maturity) and 
relationship characteristics (lending relationship, lending from other banks, non-lending 
products). To address the problem of serially correlated outcomes in the differences-in-
differences estimation (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004) standard errors are 
clustered at the branch level. 
Table V presents the results of the estimation of specification (3) and reports the 
marginal effects. Column (1) shows that under delegation credit applications are less 
likely to get an approval. To control for differences in firm quality the paper includes the 
control variables in column (2) and show that the delegation of authority does not 
increase the likelihood of an approval. This result suggests that the delegation does not 
result in a significant loss of control in the sense that an average credit application has not 
a higher likelihood of an approval after the delegation. Even though the paper finds that 
business directors are not more likely to approve a credit application than a risk manager, 
they could still approve different credit applications than a risk manager would approve. 
To test this prediction the paper interacts the treated   post variable with the non-lending 
products dummy. The expectation is that business directors are more likely to approve 





approval increases with 25 percentage points if the firm purchases non-lending products 
and the business director makes the credit approval decision. In column (4) the paper 
interacts the treated   post variable with a dummy which takes the value of 1 if the credit 
application has an above average credit volume. Since the remuneration of the business 
director depends on the new credit volume the expectation is that business directors are 
more likely to approve credit applications with a high credit volume. However, the paper 
does not find evidence for this prediction.  
The evidence in this section shows that business directors make a different credit 
decision than risk managers if a firm purchases non-lending products. This suggests that 
the objectives of the business director are similar to the objectives of the loan officers 
since the paper also finds that loan officers use more scoring trials if the firm purchases 
non-lending products and a risk manager makes the credit approval decision.
20
 These two 
results provide evidence for Dessein’s (2002) trade-off between a loss of information 
under communication and a loss of control under delegation. Dessein (2002) predicts that 
delegation is optimal for the principal if the bias in objectives between the principal and 
the agent is sufficiently small. The results of this paper do not show whether the bank was 
better off after the delegation of authority, but do show that the bias in objectives is an 
important consideration in the decision to delegate authority.    
 
7. Placebo test 
The results presented in the previous section could be driven by changes in the control 
and treatment branches unrelated to the delegation of authority. The bank officially 
divested the branches in the beginning of 2010 and the changes in the control branches 
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To test for this explanation the paper estimates the following specification: 
 
                                                               
                                                                                                                   (4) 
 
where the Ln(                     is the natural logarithm of the number of scoring 
trials of credit application i at branch j by loan officer k at time t,          is a dummy 
variable which takes the value of one if the approval authority was delegated to the 
business director of branch j,              takes the value of one after the official 
divestment of the branches,      is a matrix of control variables,    are branch fixed 
effects,    are year-month fixed effects and      is the error term. The matrix of control 
variables includes the outcomes of the first scoring trial (orange and red), firm 
characteristics (firm size, leverage and profitability), credit application characteristics (the 
natural logarithm of the new credit volume, the collateral ratio and the maturity) and 
relationship characteristics (lending relationship, lending from other banks, non-lending 
products). To address the problem of serially correlated outcomes in the differences-in-
differences estimation (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004) standard errors are 
clustered at the branch level.  
 Table VI presents the results. Although the results on the first approval score 
variables are similar to the results in Table IV, the coefficients on the interaction of the 
approval scores between the treated   divestment variable is not significant in all 
specifications. This suggests that the incentives of the loan officers to manipulate 
information did not change after the investments, which rules out the explanation that 
changes in the competitive landscape drive the result and not the organizational change. 
 
8. Conclusions   
The decision to delegate authority depends on the trade-off between a loss of information 
under communication and a loss of control under delegation. An agent could manipulate 





than the agent. The delegation of authority mitigates the problem of information 
manipulation, but this could result in a loss of control.   
This paper empirically examines this trade-off by exploiting an organizational 
change in a small lending division in a large commercial bank in the Netherlands. In 
October 2010, the bank delegated the authority to approve small business loans from the 
risk management department to the business directors of local branches, except for a 
number of mandatory divested branches, which are used as control group.  
The bank uses risk management software which scores the credit application and 
allows loan officers to make multiple scoring trials if the first scoring trial is not 
successful. The paper uses the number of scoring trials and the changes between the first 
and the final trial as empirical measures of information manipulation by loan officers. 
Based on a sample of more than 23,000 small business loan applications the paper tests 
whether the delegation of authority reduces the incentives of the loans officers to use 
multiple scoring trials and adjust the parameters of the credit application. The results 
show that loan officers use less scoring trials and are less likely to improve the approval 
score of the application if their own business director has the approval authority. 
 The paper tests whether the approval decision of a business director differs from 
an approval decision of a risk manager. The paper finds that the business director is more 
likely to approve a credit application with additional sales of non-lending products than a 
risk manager, which suggests that the delegation of authority could result in a loss of 
control. 
The results suggest that the delegation of authority could mitigate the problem of 
information manipulation, but results in a loss of control if there are large differences in 
objectives. The implication of the results is that decision makers should carefully 
examine the differences in objectives between the decision maker and the information 







Figure 1: The timeline of the divestment of the control group branches 
Figure 1 presents the timeline of the divestment of the control branches and the delegation of authority at 
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After the change 
Figure 2: Delegation of the approval authority 
Panel A in Figure 2 illustrates the allocation of the approval authority for the treated and control branches 
before and after the change. The approval authority is the decision maker which approves credit 
applications. The abbreviation LO stands for loan officer. The outcome of an algorithm (green, orange, and 
red) determines the approval authority. Panel B shows the allocation of the approval authority by the 
outcome of the algorithm for the treated and control branches before and after the change.  
 

















Panel B: The allocation of the approval authority by approval score 
 
Approval  score     
Green  Automatic Automatic  Business director Automatic 
Orange  Risk manager Risk manager  Business director Risk manager 
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Table I: Summary statistics 
Table   presents the summary statistics of the variables employed in the empirical specifications and provides their mean, median and standard deviation for 
all 23,013 credit applications and for the treated and control branches separately. The definitions of the independent variables can be found in Appendix I. 
The paper uses a Student’s t-test to assess the differences in means between the treated branches and control branches. The differences between the 
corresponding mean values of the treated and control branches are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels using ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. 
  
 Before the change  After the change  DID 
 Treated  Non treated  Treated  Non treated   
 Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD   
Firms characteristics              
Total assets (thousand euro) 672.4 3067  749.4 1023 684.2 2810   718.1 749  43.01 
Profitability 0.33 0.65  0.19 0.39 0.321 0.672   0.21 0.52  -0.04 
Firm age < 3 years 0.05 0.22  0.05 0.22 0.052 0.222   0.05 0.21  0.007 
Firm age 3-8 years 0.20 0.40  0.19 0.39 0.187 0.390   0.19 0.39  -0.02 
Firm age > 8 years 0.59 0.49  0.68 0.46 0.588 0.492   0.65 0.47  0.03 
Credit demand 207.1 268.6  216.2 279.1 237.3 314.7   240.3 290.0  6.17 
Real estate 0.263 0.403  0.251 279.1 0.271 0.40   0.255 0.39  0.005 
Corporate investment 0.163 0.313  0.136 0.29 0.163 0.31   0.160 0.31  -0.03 
Working capital 0.495 0.982  0.528 0.48 0.483 0.57   0.506 0.48  0.008 
Relationship characteristics              
Lending relationship (0/1) 0.63 0.48  0.60 0.49 0.49 0.50   0.60 0.49  -0.03 
Lending from other banks (0/1) 0.27 0.44  0.28 0.45 0.26 0.44   0.28 0.45  0.006 
              







Table II: Information manipulation measures 
Table II presents the summary statistics for the information manipulation measures of all 23,013 credit 
applications and conditional on the first approval score. The first approval score (Green, Orange, Red) is 
the outcome of the first scoring trial of an algorithm which determines the approval authority. The 
definitions of the variables can be found in Appendix I. 
 
  Number of trials Better approval score Worse approval score 
 (%) (#) (%) (%) 
All credit applications 100.0 9.81 14.7 3.9 
First approval score     
Green   9.5 8.21 0.0 16.6 
Orange  64.9 9.73 7.12 3.5 









Table III: Information manipulation 
                                                 
Table III presents the results from regressions with the natural logarithm of the number of trials as 
dependent variable in column (1) and (2) and the dummy better approval score in column (3), which takes 
the value of one if the approval score improves between the first and last scoring trial. The sample includes 
all 23,013 credit applications. The definitions of the independent variables can be found in Appendix I. In 
addition, the baseline specification includes 192 branch dummies, 11 credit rating dummies, 29 year-month 
dummies and 13 industry dummies. The dependent variable is estimated with OLS in columns (1) and (2) 
and a probit model in column (3). The table reports the regression coefficient in columns (1) and (2) and the 







respectively . Standard errors are robust and clustered at the branch level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: Ln Number of trials Ln Number of trials Better approval score 
Model: OLS OLS Probit 














 (0.022) (0.021)  
Firm characteristics    
Firm size -0.000 0.029
***
 0.000 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) 
Leverage -0.038
***
 -0.017 -0.004 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.006) 
Profitability -0.007 0.004 0.001 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.004) 






 (0.013) (0.013) (0.006) 
Lending from other banks 0.036
***
 0.010 -0.006 








 (0.014) (0.011) (0.005) 
Credit application characteristics    





















 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
    
Branch FE Yes Yes Yes 
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year - month FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Loan officer FE  Yes  
(adj.) R-squared 0.128 0.269 0.157 
Observations 23,013 23,013 23,013 
33 
 
Table IV: Delegation of authority and information manipulation 
                                                                   
Table IV presents the results from regressions with the natural logarithm of the number of trials as dependent variable in column (1) to (3) and the 
dummy better approval score in column (5), which takes the value of one if the approval score improves between the first and last scoring trial. The 
sample includes all 23,013 credit applications. The control variables include firm characteristics (firm size, leverage, profitability), credit application 
characteristics (the natural logarithm of the new credit volume, the collateral ratio and the maturity) and relationship characteristics (lending 
relationship, lending from other banks, non-lending products). The definitions of the independent variables can be found in Appendix I. In addition, 
the baseline specification includes 192 branch dummies and 29 year-month dummies. The dependent variable is estimated with OLS in columns (1) to 
(3) and a probit model in columns (4) and (5). The table reports the regression coefficient in columns (1) to (3) and the marginal effects in columns (4) 










 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Ln Number of trials Ln Number of trials Ln Number of trials Better approval score Worse approval score 
Model OLS OLS OLS Probit Probit 



















   
 (0.024) (0.027) (0.023)   
Treated   Post 0.051 -0.073 -0.080 0.060*** -0.042*** 
 (0.042) (0.061) (0.063) (0.019) (0.004) 
Treated   Post   Orange  0.093 0.106** -0.089*** 0.127*** 
  (0.057) (0.051) (0.006) (0.019) 
Treated   Post   Red  0.171*** 0.194***   
  (0.049) (0.052)   
      
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Branch FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year - month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan officer FE   Yes   
(adj.) R-squared 0.125 0.125 0.268 0.138 0.075 
Observations 23,013 23,013 23,013 23,013 23,013 
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Table V: Delegation of authority and the approval decision 
                                                      
Table V presents the results from regressions with application approved as dependent variable. The 
sample includes all 23,013 credit applications. The control variables include firm characteristics (firm 
size, leverage, profitability), credit application characteristics (the natural logarithm of the new credit 
volume, the collateral ratio and the maturity) and relationship characteristics (lending relationship, 
lending from other banks, non-lending products). The definitions of the variables can be found in 
Appendix I. In addition, the baseline specification includes 192 branch dummies and 29 year-month 
dummies. The dependent variable is estimated with a probit model and the table reports the marginal 






 respectively . Standard 
errors are robust and clustered at branch level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treated   Post -0.079** -0.006 -0.184*** -0.008 
 (0.031) (0.023) (0.031) (0.028) 
Treated   Post   Non-lending products   0.258***  
   (0.016)  
Treated   Post   Above median new credit volume    0.002 
    (0.019) 
     
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes 
Branch FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year – month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.047 0.276 0.285 0.272 






Table VI: Placebo test 
                                                                         
Table VI presents the results from regressions with the natural logarithm of the number of trials as dependent variable in column (1) to (3) and the 
dummy better approval score in column (5), which takes the value of one if the approval score improves between the first and last scoring trial. The 
sample includes all 23,013 credit applications. The control variables include firm characteristics (firm size, leverage, profitability), credit application 
characteristics (the natural logarithm of the new credit volume, the collateral ratio and the maturity) and relationship characteristics (lending 
relationship, lending from other banks, non-lending products). The definitions of the independent variables can be found in Appendix I. In addition, 
the baseline specification includes 192 branch dummies and 29 year-month dummies. The dependent variable is estimated with OLS in columns (1) to 
(3) and a probit model in columns (4) and (5). The table reports the regression coefficient in columns (1) to (3) and the marginal effects in columns (4) 






 respectively . Standard errors are robust and clustered at the branch 
level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Ln Number of trials Ln Number of trials Ln Number of trials Better approval score Worse approval score 
Model OLS OLS OLS Probit Probit 



















   
 (0.023) (0.020) (0.013)   
Treated   Divestment -0.013 0.024 0.051 -0.023 0.078 
 (0.030) (0.043) (0.050) (0.051) (0.098) 
Treated   Divestment  Orange  -0.030 -0.045 0.008 0.137 
  (0.046) (0.045) (0.065) (0.155) 
Treated   Divestment  Red  -0.057 -0.061   
  (0.046) (0.053)   
      
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Branch FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year - month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan officer FE   Yes   
(adj.) R-squared 0.124 0.108 0.230 0.15 0.03 




Appendix I: Variable definitions 
 
 
Variable name Definition 
Firm characteristics  
Total assets  Total assets from the latest annual report, in thousand euro. 
Leverage Total liabilities / total assets. 
Profitability EBIT / total assets. 
Credit rating Firm credit rating ranging from 2 (no problems) to 5 (potential 
problems). 
  
Relationship characteristics  
Lending relationship  = 1 if the firm has an existing lending relationship with the bank 
and 0 otherwise. 
Lending from other banks  = 1 if the firm has debt from other banks and 0 otherwise. 
Non-lending products  = 1 if the firm purchases non-lending products from the bank and 0 
otherwise. 
  
Credit application characteristics  
New credit volume New credit volume of the credit application, in thousand euro. 
Collateral ratio Total collateral value / Total credit volume. 
Maturity  Facility size weighted average maturity of the credit application, in 
years. 
Interest spread  Facility size weighted average interest spread of the credit 
application, in basis points. 
  
Credit approval characteristics  
First approval score  
  Green  = 1 if the first approval score is green and 0 otherwise. The first 
approval score (Green, Orange, Red) is the outcome of the first 
scoring trial of an algorithm which determines the approval 
authority.     
  Orange  = 1 if the first approval score is orange and 0 otherwise. The first 
approval score (Green, Orange, Red) is the outcome of the first 
scoring trial of an algorithm which determines the approval 
authority. 
  Red  = 1 if the first approval score is red and 0 otherwise. The first 
approval score (Green, Orange, Red) is the outcome of the first 
scoring trial of an algorithm which determines the approval 
authority. 
Number of trials Number of scoring trials for a credit application.  
Better approval score = 1 if the final approval score is better than the first approval score 
and 0 otherwise. 
Worse approval score = 1 if the final approval score is worse than the first approval score 
and 0 otherwise. 
Application approved = 1 if the credit application has been approved and 0 otherwise. 
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This paper studies firm bargaining behavior in the credit market using a unique hand-
collected data set on 18,591 credit negotiations between small firms and a large 
commercial bank. In a typical credit negotiation the firm and the bank firstly sets the 
collateral requirements, then the non-interest credit terms of the credit lines and term 
loans and finally the interest rates and fees. The bank extracts rents in the first offer from 
relationships and opaque firms and these firms are less likely to negotiate interest rate 
concessions, which suggest that informational frictions in the credit market give banks 
bargaining power. Negotiating firms pay a 33 basis points lower interest rate than 






1. Introduction  
The terms of credit contracts are often subject to negotiation. In negotiations the credit 
terms are set depending on the relative bargaining power of the firm and the bank. The 
distribution of bargaining power between firms and banks, affects investment decisions, 
choices of financing sources and entrepreneurial effort (Inderst and Müller, 2004; Rajan, 
1992).
1
 Although bargaining power is important in financial decision making, there is 
little empirical research on bargaining behavior in credit negotiations. Data on real world 
negotiations is difficult to obtain because they take place in private meetings, on the 
phone or by e-mail.
2
 Consequently, a number of important questions remain unanswered: 
How and when are credit terms set in negotiations? Do lending relationships and firm 
opaqueness affect bargaining behavior?  
This is the first paper that examines bargaining behavior in the small business 
credit market, using a unique hand collected data base including detailed information 
about the negotiation process. The small business credit market provides a useful 
empirical setting to study bargaining behavior. First, proprietary information about 
opaque small firms could give a bank an informational advantage over its competitors 
(Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). This informational advantage gives the bank bargaining 
power. Second, the existing literature shows that small business interest rates exhibit 
substantial dispersion, even after one takes into account the differences in firm, loan, 
relationship and market characteristics (e.g. Cerqueiro, Degryse and Ongena, 2011). 
Interest rate dispersion suggests that frictions in the credit market enable banks to 
negotiate firm specific interest rates, depending on their relative bargaining power. 
Central to this study is a data set of 18,591 credit negotiations between small 
firms and one large commercial bank in the Netherlands during the period January 2008 - 
                                                 
1
 Bargaining power does not only affect the financial decisions of firms. A growing theoretical literature 
investigates the effects of bargaining in decentralized financial markets (e.g. Duffie, Gârleanu and 
Pedersen, 2005; 2007) and shows that the distribution of bargaining power affects the prices and allocation 
of assets. 
2
 Several papers have examined bargaining in retail transactions.  Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso 
(2004) compare survey data on buyer characteristics and price/purchase outcomes from car dealerships and 
Ayers and Siegelman (1995) use an audit survey methodology to test for discrimination against blacks and 
women in bargaining for cars. However, there is no study which focuses on bargaining behavior between 





December 2011. The bank is one of the top five commercial banks in the Netherlands and 
its business practices, information acquisition and loan data are highly representative for 
the banking industry in the U.S. and Europe. The lending software of the bank records a 
time stamp when loan officer create the credit terms of the offer, e.g. the collateral 
requirements, and a time stamp of the last update of the terms, which enables to study 
when the individual credit terms are set. In addition, the lending software records both the 
credit terms of the first offer and the credit agreement. This enables to study how the 
bank sets the first offer, which firms reach an agreement and negotiate better terms. 
 The paper analyses the order at which loan officers set the credit terms in the 
negotiation. Most empirical studies on borrowing costs and collateral assume that 
collateral and interest rate conditions are determined sequentially, with the collateral 
decision preceding the interest rate determination (Degryse, Kim and Ongena, 2009). 
This paper shows that in 87 percent of the negotiations the firm and the bank first set the 
collateral requirements, then the non-interest credit terms of the credit lines and term 
loans and finally the interest rates and fees of the facilities. After the approval of the 
credit offer, the firm and the bank most frequently negotiate about the interest rates and 
fees. These findings stress the importance of collateral in the design of credit contracts 
and confirm that the interest is the last term set in negotiations. The paper does not find 
evidence that the firm and the bank tradeoff collateral and interest rates. 
An important puzzle in the empirical banking literature is whether the length of the 
relationship between the firm and the bank increases or decreases the firm’s cost of 
credit. The private information which the bank collects over the relationship could give 
the bank an informational monopoly and enable them to extract informational rents from 
good firms (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). On the other hand, relationships could reduce 
information asymmetries between the firm and the bank and therefore reduce the cost of 
credit of small firms (Boot and Thakor, 1994). The empirical literature on banking 
relationships analyses the outcomes of credit negotiations but finds mixed evidence.
 3
  
                                                 
3
 See Degryse, Kim, and Ongena (2009) for an overview of the empirical evidence on the effect of lending 
relationships on firm bargaining power. ). Many studies run reduced-form regression of the firm’s cost of 





This paper is the first paper which studies the negotiation process and the impact of 
relationships on bargaining behavior. The paper finds that the interest rate of the first 
offer to relationships is 30 basis points higher than the interest rate of new clients of the 
bank. In addition, relationships are 3 percent less likely to negotiate an interest decrease, 
and are more likely to reach an agreements then similar firm without relationship 
applying for a similar credit facility. The bank uses information collected over the course 
of the lending relationship, such as the credit line usage and transaction account behavior, 
to discriminate between “good” and “bad” firms in the first offer. Bad firms are less 
likely to negotiate a lower interest rate, which is consistent with “informational capture” 
theories. 
A large literature in corporate finance examines how asymmetric information in 
the process of raising external capital can generate financial constraints for firms.
4
 
Financially constraint firms have less access to competing offers when searching for 
outside finance and therefore should have less bargaining power in the credit market. 
This paper tests this prediction by examining whether larger and older firms receive a 
better first offer and are more likely to negotiate interest rate concessions. Hadlock and 
Pierce (2010) show that in particular small and young firms are financially constraint 
because these firms have a shorter track record and do not always have audited annual 
reports. The paper finds that large and older firms receive a first offer with a lower 
interest rate and are more likely to negotiate a lower interest rate, which suggest that 
these firms have indeed more bargaining power in the credit market. 
A firm possesses bargaining power if the firm can affect the bargaining outcome 
in a way desirable for him. If interest decreases in negotiations actually capture firm 
bargaining power, negotiating firms should pay a lower interest rate than similar firms 
which accept the first offer. The results show that negotiating firms pay an interest rate 
                                                                                                                                                 
duration of the relationship, while others find the relationship duration does not matter or the cost of credit 
decreases over the lending relationship. Explanations for these mixed results are differences in the included 
control variables, definitions of firm-bank relationships, empirical measures of the cost of credit and 
composition of the pool of borrowers (Degryse, Kim, and Ongena, 2009 
4
 See Hadlock and Pierce (2010) for an overview on the literature on the measurement of financial 
constraints and Almeida and Campello (2007) for an overview on the literature on the impact of financial 





which is 33 basis points lower than similar firms which accept the first offer of the banks. 
Conversations with loan officers tell that “a quarter” (25 basis points) is a common 
discount they give in negotiations, which is close to the estimated coefficient. The results 
also show that the magnitude of the negotiated discount depends on firm characteristics. 
The negotiated discount is smaller for large firms. One explanation for this finding is that 
banks face more competition when offering credit to larger firms and therefore make a 
better offer in the first place. Since the height of the first offer determines the room to 
negotiate, a more competitive first offer allows the bank only to decrease the interest with 
a smaller amount. This is consistent with the finding that larger firms receive a lower 
interest rate in the first offer.  
The primary contribution of this study is to provide the first empirical evidence on 
the negotiation process and bargaining behavior. The papers is related to the literature on 
the impact of relationships on the cost of credit. Closest to this paper are Aggarwal and 
Hauswald (2010), Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) and Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders and 
Srinivasan (2011). Aggarwal and Hauswald (2010) show that banks strategically use their 
local information advantage to create adverse-selection threats for their rivals, which 
gives them more bargaining power. Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) show that switching 
firms pay a lower interest rate at their new bank than similar firms which do not switch, 
but face an increase the interest rate over time. This paper shows that bank use privately 
collected information in credit negotiations and have bargaining power over relationships 
and opaque firms. Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders and Srinivasan (2011) show that lending 
relationships yield substantial benefits in the syndicating loan market. One explanation 
for this different finding is that firms in the syndicated loan market are larger and more 
transparent. Stronger competition in the syndicated loan market may force banks to pass 
on monitoring costs savings to the borrower. 
This study is also related to a growing number of empirical studies on the design 
of credit contracts. Berger, Frame and Ioannidou (2011) and Cerqueiro, Roszbach, and 
Ongena (forthcoming) show that collateral has an important impact on the supply and 
cost of bank credit, bank monitoring incentives and that collateral reduces ex ante 





This study shows that in a typical credit negotiation the bank and the firm firstly set the 
collateral and thereafter the other credit terms, which suggests that collateral is important 
in the negotiation process.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses hypotheses, 
Section 3 the data, the negotiation process and the descriptive statistics. Section 4 and 5 
the results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical predictions 
Do lending relationships and firm opaqueness affect bargaining behavior? The bargaining 
behavior of the bank and the firms comprises the first offer of the bank to the firm, the 
concessions made in the negotiations and the likelihood that the negotiations results in an 
agreement.  The goal of this section is to answer this question in order to motivate and 
guide the empirical analysis that follows.   
2.1 The effect of relationships on bargaining behavior 
2.1.1 The effect of relationships on the first offer of the bank 
Relationship banks gather customer-specific information over time through multiple 
interactions (Boot, 2000). This information, such as information on checking account 
activity of the firm (Norden and Weber, 2010), is proprietary and not observable by other 
banks. Private information reduces adverse selection concerns, but also affects the 
competition between the relationship bank and outside banks which do not lend to the 
firm. Relationship banks could identify “good” and “bad” firms based on their private 
information, while these firms are observationally identical for all banks which do not 
lend to these firms. In credit negotiations they exploit this informational advantage by 
extracting informational rents from “good” firms (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992; Von 
Thadden, 2004). Therefore, these “informational capture” theories predict that banks have 
bargaining power over their relationships in credit negotiations. The private information 
of the bank should therefore predict the first offer of the bank.  
Alternatively, the private information of relationship banks reduces information 





relationship lender could share or pass on these cost savings to the firm and which 
reduces the borrowing costs for relationships (Boot and Thakor, 1994). This allows the 
relationship bank to make a better first offer to their relationships. 
This paper uses the first offer all-in interest rate as the measure of the interest rate 
charged on a loan. The first offer all-in interest rate measures the interest rate plus any 
associated fees of the first credit offer to the firm. If bank exploit their informational 
advantage, they would make a higher first offer to relationships. In addition, this paper 
uses two variables which the bank could only observe over the course of the relationship: 
the first measure captures whether the bank has in general a good experience with the 
firm and the second measure is an internal credit rating based on the credit line usage and 
transaction account behavior of the firm. Mester, Nakamura, and Renault (2007) and 
Norden and Weber (2010) show that this information is used by banks in monitoring and 
lending decisions.  The empirical section of this paper will discuss the two measures in 
detail. Informational capture theories predict that banks use this information and make 
different offers to “bad” and “good” firms which are observably equivalent for other 
banks. Specifically, the paper tests the following two hypotheses: 
 
H.1. The first offer to relationship firms has a higher all-in interest rate relative to non-
relationship firms. 
 
H.2. The bank uses its private information in negotiations by making a better first offer to 
“good” firms. 
 
2.1.2 The effect of relationships on concessions  
After having received the first offer, the firm could directly accept the first offer, 
negotiate better terms or accept the offer of another bank. Traditional bilateral bargaining 
models (e.g. Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1985) predict that the bank observes the 
bargaining power of the firm and sets a first offer which the firm directly accepts. Bank 





after the firm accepts the best offer.
5
 In these models multi stage negotiations with 
concessions do not occur.   
An important feature of a credit offer which could explain multi stage 
negotiations is the expiration date of the offer. In contrast with strategic bargaining 
theories, which assume that parties directly accept or reject an offer, a credit offer expires 
after a pre-determined period. For example, in practice credit offers often expire in two 
weeks. When there is ex ante uncertainty about the bargaining power of the firm and 
offers expire after a pre-determined period, the bank optimally sets a high first offer and 
after the uncertainty about the outside options of the firm has been resolved the bank 
improves the offer of firms with better outside offers and firms without outside offers 
accept the first offer of the bank.
6
  
The informational advantage of the relationship bank reduces the likelihood that a 
relationship firm receives better outside offers and is therefore less likely to negotiate and 
interest decrease. Von Thadden (2004) shows that relationship banks make offers to 
“bad” firms which equal their marginal lending costs and extract an informational rent 
from “good” firms. Since the relationship bank does not extract profit from bad firms, 
they could not make concessions to them in credit negotiations. If the bank makes 
concessions, it will be to the good firms. These predictions result in the following two 
hypotheses: 
 
H.3. Firms with a lending relationship are less likely to negotiate. 
 
H.4. Banks will only make concessions to “good firms”. 
 
Although lower screening and monitoring costs for relationships could result in a lower 
first offer interest rate, these relationship benefits are unlikely to change over the 
negotiation. In addition, the underlying credit risk of small firms is also unlikely to 
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 See for example Sharpe (1990) or Rajan (1992). 
6
 Lee (1994) and Chatterjee and Lee (1998) show that in a market in which firms could ‘recall’ their first 
offer and uncertainty about the outside options of the firm, negotiations with more than one offer can occur 





change. Therefore, hypothesis 3 and 4 are a clean test for the predictions of 
“informational capture” theories (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992).  
 There are three alternative explanations why banks make concessions in credit 
negotiations. Firstly, the firm might provide new information to the bank, for example a 
new annual report, which changes the bank’s estimate of the creditworthiness of the firm 
and convinces the bank to improve the offer because of lower risk. Secondly, financial 
contracting theories predict that a trade-off between collateral requirements and the 
interest rate could resolve information asymmetries between the bank and the firm 
(Bester, 1980). Changes in credit terms over the negotiation could reflect these trade-offs. 
Thirdly, the bargaining ability of the loan officer affects bargaining behavior in credit 
negotiations. The empirical part of this paper tests whether these alternative explanations 
could explain changes in credit terms over the negotiation.  
 
2.3 The effect of relationships on the likelihood of an agreement  
Relationships affect the likelihood that the firm reaches an agreement with the bank. Von 
Thadden (2004) shows that outside banks limit the bargaining power of the relationship 
bank by offering competing lower interest rates using “optimal randomization” to the 
firms from the relationship bank. As a result “bad” firms and occasionally “good” firms 
switch to the outside bank if the outside bank offers them a better deal. Therefore, 
relationships are more likely to accept the credit offer of the bank; in particular the good 
firms because they receive only sporadically receive a good offer from outside banks. 
This prediction results in the following hypothesis:  
 
H.5. Relationships are more likely to reach an agreement with relationships and this 
likelihood is higher if the bank has positive private information about the firm. 
 
Although hypothesis 3, 4 and 5 are a prediction on the effect of relationships on the 
bargaining behavior of the firm, they to not predict when the firm decides to accept the 
negotiated offer and when the firm decides to accept the offer of the other bank. A 





to another bank. The empirical analysis which will follow will examine whether firms 
with bargaining power prefer to negotiate or to switch. 
 
2.2 The effect of opaqueness on bargaining behavior 
A large literature in corporate finance examines how asymmetric information in the 
process of raising external capital can generate financial constraints for firms.  
Financially constraint firms have less access to competing offers when searching for 
outside finance and therefore should therefore have less bargaining power in the credit 
market. This paper tests this prediction by examining whether the size and age of the firm 
affect their bargaining behavior. Hadlock and Pierce (2010) show that in particular small 
and young firms are financially constraint because these firms have a shorter track record 
and do not always have audited annual reports. Therefore, opaque firms will receive a 
higher first offer, are less likely to negotiate and are more likely to reach an agreement 
with the bank. The paper tests the following hypothesis: 
 
H.6. Opaque firms have less bargaining power in credit negotiations. 
 
3. Negotiation data  
3.1 The sample 
The sample consists of 18,591 credit negotiations between 15,909 non-financial, small 
firms and a large commercial bank over the period January 2008 - December 2011.
7
 The 
bank is one of the top five commercial banks in the Netherlands and its business 
practices, information acquisition and loan data are highly representative for the banking 
industry. The Netherlands has a bank-based financial system, but is similar to the U.S. in 
general economic, financial, and technological development. Although the market 
structure of the banking sector is relatively concentrated, the largest banks have branches 
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 The sample period overlaps the 2007-2009 credit crisis. However, the decrease in aggregate corporate 
credit growth in the Netherlands was less severe in comparison with other European countries and the 






in each region and are not geographically concentrated.
8
 The cultural values in the 
Netherlands, which could affect bargaining behavior (Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara 
and Zamir, 1991), are very similar to the U.S. compared to other European countries 
(Hofstede, 1991).   
The firms in the sample are small and medium sized firms, such as farms, 
wholesalers, construction firms, architect bureaus and medical practices. The firms have a 
mean total asset size of 607 thousand euro, 3 employees and are comparable with small 
U.S. firms covered by the 2003 National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF).
9
 
Firms have in 66 percent of the negotiations an existing relationship with the bank and in 
24 percent of the negotiations bank debt from other banks. The average (median) new 
credit demand of the firms is 227 (145) thousand euro.
10
 Both prospective and existing 
customers apply for new credit, new facilities are no renewal or adjustment of existing 
facilities and the firms in the sample are not in default. Therefore, this study does not 





3.2 The negotiation process 
The negotiation process starts with a meeting in which the firm and the loan officer 
discuss the credit demand and business prospects. Based on the discussion with the firm 
the loan officer structures the draft credit offer. The draft credit offer consist of the 
general terms and conditions, the collateral requirements and for one or more credit 
facilities, such as credit lines and term loans, the facility size, maturity, and installments. 
For each facility, the loan officer sets the interest rate and the fees. Once the loan officer 
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 The assets of the three largest commercial banks comprise 71 percent of the asset of all commercial banks 
in 2010 (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2008). In Belgium this concentration ratio is 83 percent, while in 
Germany the three largest commercial banks comprise 38 of the asset of all commercial banks. However, in 
the banking system in Germany consist besides commercial bank of many large state-owned banks.   
9
 The median firm in the NSSBF survey has an asset size between 100 and 240 thousand dollar and 
employs five to nine employees (Mach and Wolken, 2006). 
10
 In the credit application, before the approval decision of the bank, firms specify their new credit demand 
and the specific purpose of their credit demand. 
11
 Roberts and Sufi (2009) analyze renegotiations in a sample of 1,000 syndicated loan contracts. Gilson 
(1990), Gilson, John and Kang (1990), Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994), and Benmelech and 





finishes the draft credit offer, he submits the draft credit offer for approval. After the 
approval, the loan officer prepares the official credit offer. The credit offer is an actual 
credit contract, signed by the bank, and expires after fourteen days. During this 14-day 
period, the firm could directly accept the offer, negotiate better terms with the bank or 
decide not to accept the offer. Loan officers do not have incentives to negotiate before the 
first offer. Negotiating before the approval decision violates the bank’s procedures and 
puts the loan officer’s reputation at stake.   
 
3.3 Summary statistics of the negotiation process 
The main data source of the negotiation data is the lending software of the bank. The loan 
officers use the lending software to specify the credit term of the credit offer and could 
not make offers outside this system.
12
 However, loan officers have discretion to set all the 
credit terms. A special feature of the lending software is that it records a time stamp when 
the loan officer creates the terms of the offer, e.g. the collateral requirements, and a time 
stamp of the last update of the terms. This enables to study in detail the order at which the 
individual credit terms are set. In addition, the software saves all the credit terms after the 
approval of the credit offer. Any change in the credit terms after the approval result 
automatically in a new version of the credit offer. This feature of the data allows studying 
the negotiation process after the first offer. The data does not include intermediate offers 
between the first offer and the agreement and does not include offers of other banks.    
 The paper firstly analyses the order at which the loan officer sets the credit terms 
of the credit offer. Most empirical studies on borrowing costs and collateral assume that 
collateral and interest rate conditions are determined sequentially, with the collateral 
decision preceding the interest rate determination (Degryse, Kim and Ongena, 2009).
13
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 This system is similar to the lending software described in Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) and Berg, Puri 
and Rocholl (2013). Specialized firms, such as TCI Loan origination solutions, Lenders Logic and Global 
Wave Banking Solutions offer similar specialized software packages to commercial banks for loan 
origination, workflow, approval and monitoring of commercial loans. 
13
 See Degryse, Kim and Ongena (2009) for a detailed overview on the large literature studying the terms of 
a credit contract. Examples are Petersen and Rajan (1994; 1995), Berger and Udell (1995), Degryse and 





The negotiation data of this paper offers a unique opportunity to test this implicit 
assumption. It is important to note that lending software does not force the loan officer to 
enter the credit terms in pre-specified order. The loan officer could go back and forward 
in the credit writing software and is therefore not bound by a fixed order of the steps.  
Panel A of Table II shows the mean and median time between the first meeting 
between the firm and the loan and the last update of the collateral requirements, the 
facilities (size and maturity of the credit lines and term loans) and the pricing of the credit 
offer (all interest rates and fees). Loan officers firstly finish the collateral requirements in 
on average 17 days after the first meeting, complete the facilities of the credit offer after 
18 days and the interest rates and fees of the credit offer 21 days after the first meeting. 
Using the time stamps of the last update it is possible to determine the order in which the 
credit terms are set. Panel B shows that in 87 percent of the first offers the loan officer 
sets the collateral first, then the facilities and finally the interest rate. In 13 percent of the 
first offers, the loan officer sets first the facilities, then the collateral and finally the 
interest rate. These findings show that the interest rate is the last term set in credit 
negotiations. Existing research show the importance of collateral to reduce ex ante 
information asymmetries and ex post incentive problems between borrowers and lenders 
(Berger, Frame and Ioannidou, 2011). The result that in most negotiation collateral is set 
first confirms the important role of collateral in the design of credit contracts. When 
distinguishing between relationships and new clients, the table shows that in almost all 
negotiations with existing relationships collateral is set first. Relationships pledged often 
already collateral for existing credit lines and term loans and add new loans while 
keeping the collateral the same. This is in line with the evidence that relationships pledge 
less collateral (Berger and Udell, 1995; Chakraborty and Hu, 2006; Degryse and 
Cayseele, 2000). 
 Loan officers could only make a first offer after an approval by the risk 
management department. The first offer consists of a general credit agreement, including 
the description of the parties, the general conditions of the credit contract, covenants and 
                                                                                                                                                 
collateral and the interest rate are set independently and estimate a system of two equations and find 





the collateral requirements, and the credit terms of the individual facilities (credit lines 
and term loans). The loan officer specifies for each new facility (credit lines and term 
loans) the facility size, the maturity and the installments. Table III presents the 
descriptive statistics of the new facilities in the first offer. The new facility is in 37 
percent of the facilities a credit line and the remaining facilities are term loans.  The 
average facility has a size of 137 thousand euro, a maturity of 7 years and a collateral 
ratio of 81 percent. In small business lending financial covenants are hardly used because 
of the high monitoring costs. In general, the bank uses the credit line usage and 
transaction account behavior to monitor small firms because this information could be 
processed automatically at lower costs. The average interest rate is 621 basis points and 
includes fees.  
The right section of Table III presents the summary statistics of the credit 
facilities of the credit agreements and shows that 80 percent of the facilities are accepted 
by the firms.
14
 The average facility size of the facilities is smaller which suggest that 
firms are less likely to reach an agreement on larger facilities. For all the agreements, the 
paper calculate the difference in credit terms of the facilities between the first offer and 
the agreement and defines two dummy variables which take the value of one if the credit 
term increased (decreased) and zero otherwise. The most frequent credit term change is 
an interest decrease (15 percent of the negotiations), while the new credit volume, 
collateral value and maturity change in less than 3 percent of the negotiations. The other 
credit terms change in both directions, however most credit volume and most collateral 
changes change in firm favorable directions. Since changes in other credit terms than the 
interest rate occur relatively infrequent there is little scope to identify a single economic 
mechanism driving these changes.
15
 The average negotiation time is 13 days which shows 
that the bank and the firm reach an agreement in a relative short period.  
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 Firms which do not reach an agreement either accept an offer of another bank or withdraw from the 
credit market. Firms do not report whether they accepted an offer of another bank.  Since it is not possible 
to observe the credit term changes of negotiations which do not result in an agreement, the data is 
incidentally truncated. To address this potential selection problem, the paper estimates a heckman selection 
problem and finds that selection does not change the results. 
15
 Roberts and Sufi (2009) show that in renegotiations of syndicated loans also the amount and the maturity 





 Financial contracting theories suggest that the bank could offer a menu of 
contracts to resolve ex ante information asymmetries. Specifically, banks could offer a 
menu of collateral requirements and interest rates such that observationally equivalent 
firms with higher quality projects choose secured loans with a low interest rate, while 
firms with low quality projects self-select into unsecured loans with higher interest rates 
(e.g., Bester 1985). These theories predict a tradeoff in credit negotiations between the 
interest rate and other credit terms if the bank offers its menu sequentially to the firm. 
Panel B of Table III tests this prediction and presents the empirical distribution of the 
tradeoffs between the interest rate and the other credit terms. Remarkably, in 95 percent 
of the agreements on a credit facility there are no credit term changes or only interest 
changes. In addition, the table also does not provide evidence for a clear tradeoff between 
credit terms in the negotiations in which the interest rate changes in combination with 
another credit term (for example a lower interest rate and more collateral). These two 
findings suggests that tradeoff theories do not form an important explanation for the 
observed credit term changes after the first offer.   
 Figure 1 shows the distribution of the interest rate decreases conditional on an 
interest decrease. Loan officers most frequently make a concessions of 50 basis points, 
followed by concessions of 25 basis points. Panel C of Table III presents the empirical 
distribution of the interest changes. The table investigate the relation between the heights 
of the first offer and the distribution of the interest changes and shows that the magnitude 
of the interest decreases are larger for the highest decile of the first offers than the lowest 
decile. This suggest that loan officer which set a high first offer have a larger negotiation 
room which enables to make in larger interest concessions.   
 
3. The effect of lending relationships and firm opaqueness  
Do lending relationships and firm opaqueness affect bargaining behavior? This section 
investigates how these two factors affect the setting of the first offer of the bank, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
that they consider renegotiations of existing facilities and compares the credit terms between the origination 
of the syndicated loan and the first renegotiations of the contract, while this paper only examines new 





likelihood of an interest decrease and the likelihood that the firm and the bank reach an 
agreement.  
 
3.1 The first offer  
Loan officers sets the first offer based on their analysis of the creditworthiness of the firm 
and their information about the bargaining power of the firm. This section tests the 
prediction that relationships and small and young firms have less bargaining power and 
receive a first offer with a higher interest rate. The advantage of analyzing the first offer 
of the bank instead of the outcomes of the negotiations is that it also include the offers 
which do not reach an agreement with the bank which reduces selection concerns. To test 
the impact of relationships and opaqueness on the first offer, the paper estimates the 
following specification: 
 
first offer interest ratei  = β1 relationshipi + β2 opaquenessi + β2 Xi +εi ,          (1) 
 
where first offer interest ratei is the all-in interest rate of the facility in the first offer of 
the bank to the firm, relationshipi is a vector which includes the relationship variables 
relationship, relationship length, debt from other banks, good reputation and three 
customer risk grade dummies, opaqueness i is a vector which includes firm size and three 
firm age dummies, Xi is a vector with control variables to control for differences in the 
credit terms of the facilities and observable credit risk. Each credit offer could include 
multiple facilities and since the errors of facilities within the same credit offer could be 
correlated, the paper clusters the standard errors at the credit offer level. 
To capture the strength of the relationship the paper uses dummy relationship 
which takes the value of one if the firm has an existing relationship with the bank, the 
logarithm of the relationship length in years and a dummy debt from other banks which 
takes the value of one if the firm has debt of other banks. Over the lending relationship 
the bank collects private information about the creditworthiness of the firm. To capture 
this private information the paper includes a dummy reputation which takes the value of 





with the bank and the bank has in general a good experience with the firm. In addition, 
specification includes three dummies which measure whether the firm has a good, 
medium or bad customer risk grade. The customer risk grade is a rating based on the 
credit line usage and transaction account behavior of the firm.  Mester, Nakamura, and 
Renault (2007) and Norden and Weber (2010) show that this information is a good 
predictor of defaults in addition to available public information and is used in lending 
decisions. The paper uses firm size, measured as the logarithm of the total assets of the 
firm and three firm age dummies to capture the opaqueness of the firm. Young and 
smaller firms are more opaque because of the shorter track record and often unaudited 
financial records and Hadlock and Pierce (2010) show that firm size and age are an 
important indicator of financial constraints. The first offer interest rate contains bank 
rents, the credit risk premium and the funding costs of the bank. To control for the credit 
risk premium and the funding costs of the bank the specification includes the non-interest 
credit terms of the first offer, such as the collateral ration, the facility size, the maturity of 
the facility and three dummies which take the value of one if the facility is a credit line, 
has a fixed interest rate and include installment. In addition, the specification includes the 
internal funding costs of the facility, 12 credit rating dummies, 11 industry dummies, 12 
year month dummies, and 80 branch dummies. 
Table IV presents the results of the estimation of the first offer interest rate. The 
first column tests hypothesis H.1. that relationships receive a higher first offer than other 
firms. The results in column (1) show that the offer to firms with a relationship is 20 basis 
points higher than similar new clients of the bank which apply for a similar credit facility. 
The paper finds similar results when using the alternative relationship measure, 
relationship length, which are presented in column (2). The interest rate on the first offer 
of firms with debt from other banks is slightly higher than the offer of firms without other 
lending relationships, but this result is not robust over different specifications. In 
addition, young and small firms receive a higher first offer interest rate. The specification 
includes various controls to account for differences in credit risk, such as the first offer 
non-interest credit terms of the facilities and, industry dummies, credit rating dummies 





size and age are correlated with unobserved credit risk the paper estimates in the next 
section the impact of relationship and opaqueness on the interest changes.  
Hypothesis H.2. predicts that banks use private information to discriminate 
between good and bad firms which are observably equivalent for other banks. To test this 
prediction the paper includes two measures which capture information about the 
creditworthiness of the relationships which the bank collects over the course of the 
lending relationship, the reputation of the firm and the customer risk grade based on the 
credit line usage and transaction account activity of the firm. Firms with a good 
reputation receive a 27 basis points lower first offer and firms with a bad customer risk 
grade receive a 24 basis points higher first offer. These results show that the bank uses 
this information to discriminate between “good” and “bad” firms which is in line with 
informational capture theories.  
 An alternative explanation for the results is differences in the bargaining ability of 
the loan officer. If better more experienced loan officers negotiate with relationships, not 
the informational advantage of the bank but differences in the ability of the loan officers 
explain why relationships receive a higher offer. To test whether loan officer bargaining 
ability drives the results the paper includes loan officer fixed effects. The coefficient on 
relationships decreases which suggests that loan officer fixed effects are correlated with 
the relationship variables, but the main result that relationships receive a higher first offer 
does not change. 
  
3.2. The likelihood of an interest decrease 
The previous section shows that relationships, small and young firms receive a higher 
first offer than otherwise similar firms. One concern is that these variables are correlated 
with unobserved credit risk which implies that they are riskier than other firms. To 
address this concern, this section estimates the likelihood of an interest decrease. Since 
credit negotiations take place in a relative short period of 11 days, the underlying 






The paper estimates the likelihood of an interest decrease with the following probit 
model: 
 
        Pr(interest decreasei) =  Ф (β1 relationshipi + β2 opaqueness + β2 Xi),             (2) 
 
where Pr(interest decreasei) is the probability of an interest decrease 
(                  ), Ф(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, 
relationshipi is a vector which includes the relationship variables relationship, 
relationship length, debt from other banks, good reputation and three customer risk grate 
dummies, opaquenessi is a vector which includes firm size and three firm age dummies, Xi 
is a vector with control variables to control for differences in the credit terms of first offer 
and observable credit risk. The control variables include the first offer interest rate which 
determines the initial size of the bank rents and therefore the room to negotiate. In 
addition, the specification includes 13 industry fixed effects, 85 branch fixed effects and 
11 year-quarter dummies. Each credit offer could include multiple facilities and since the 
errors of facilities within the same credit offer could be correlated, the paper clusters the 
standard errors at the credit offer level. 
Table V presents the results of the estimates of the likelihood of an interest 
decrease. The paper firstly tests hypothesis H.3., which predicts that relationships are less 
likely to negotiate an interest decrease. Column (1) shows that the likelihood that 
relationships negotiate an interest decrease is 3.2 percent lower than otherwise similar 
firms. Column (2) shows that firms with a longer relationship are also less likely to 
negotiate an interest decrease. These findings are consistent with the findings in Table III 
that relationships receive a higher interest rate in the first offer. The bank is less likely to 
negotiate with firms with debt from other banks. Since the likelihood and magnitude of 
the winner’s curse is higher in these situations, the bank should make less aggressive 
concessions in the negotiations. The paper also finds that larger and older firms are more 
likely to negotiate. Firms which are more than 8 years in business are 3 percentage points 
more likely to negotiate an interest decrease. Although the existing literature (e.g. 





credit, but in cross sectional studies it is difficult to disentangle whether these firms are 
less risky or whether banks extract less rents from them. Since negotiations take place 
over a short period of 12 days the actual credit risk of small firms is not likely to change. 
The results therefore show that banks have less bargaining power when negotiating with 
larger and older firms. These firms are more transparent and well known in the credit 
market and therefore are more likely to have outside options.  
Information capture theories that relationship banks make an offer to “bad” firms 
which equals their marginal lending costs and extract an informational rent from “good” 
firms. Since the relationship bank does not extract profit from bad borrowers, they could 
not make concession to them in credit negotiations. Therefore, hypothesis H.4. predicts 
that bank only negotiate with “good” firms. The paper tests this hypothesis in column (3) 
by including the private information measures. The results show that the likelihood of an 
interest decreases reduces with 4.4 percentage points if the firm has a bad customer risk 
grade, which is in line with hypothesis H.4.  
 Section 2 discussed three alternative explanations why banks make concessions in 
credit negotiations; new information which changes the banks estimate of the 
creditworthiness, trade-offs between credit terms and the bargaining ability of the loan 
officer. To test whether learning could explain the interest decreases, the paper includes 
the credit rating changes between the first offer and the agreement in the specification. If 
the bank learns new information about the firm, the bank is likely to update the firm’s 
credit rating.
16
 In 2.2 percent of the agreement the credit rating of the first offer is 
different from the credit rating of the agreement and in 1.2 percent of the agreements the 
credit rating decreases. Column (4) shows that the coefficient on the credit term changes 
is negative, but insignificant. Therefore, it is unlikely that new information about the firm 
which results in credit term changes drives the results.  
The descriptive statistics in Table III show that only a small share of the 
negotiations result in an agreement with changes in the interest rate in combination with 
other credit terms. To consider the effect of other credit term changes on the likelihood of 
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 The bank has incentives to update the credit rating because credit ratings are used for regulatory purposes 
to determine the risk weight of the loan portfolio under the Internal Ratings-Based Approach of Basel III. A 





an interest decrease, the paper includes the changes in the new credit volume, collateral 
value and maturity and non-lending product sales as explanatory variables in column (5). 
Column (5) shows that changes in the facility size increase the likelihood of an interest 
decrease, but changes in the collateral ration, maturity and covenants do not explain 
interest decreases. In 11 percent of the agreements the funding cost of the bank change 
between the first offer and the agreement. Column (5) shows that these funding cost 
changes are an important explanatory factor of interest decreases. However, they do not 
affect the main result that relationships, smaller and younger firms are less likely to 
negotiate. The firm and the bank could also negotiate about non-lending products and 
demand a lower interest rate in return for non-lending product sales. Santikian (2012) 
finds that non-lending products are an important determinant of credit terms and increase 
the bargaining power of the firm. The results of the specification in column (6) include a 
cross selling dummy which takes the value of one if the firm purchase non-lending 
products and zero otherwise. The coefficient on the cross selling dummy is positive and 
significant and shows that firms which purchase non-lending products are 2.1 percentage 
points more likely to negotiate a lower interest rate. The change in the cross selling 
dummy between the first offer and the agreement does not predict the likelihood of a 
negotiation.
17
 Although tradeoffs between the sales of non-lending products and the 





3.3 The likelihood of an interest decrease, sample selection 
The bargaining power of a firm is determined by the ability of the firm to generate 
competitive outside options. Instead of accepting the offer of the bank, firms with 
bargaining power could decide to accept an offer of another bank. The previous section 
estimates the likelihood of an interest decrease, conditional on reaching an agreement 
with the bank. A selection problem arises if firms that reach an agreement differ in 
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 Using more detailed data on cross selling for a subsample of the agreements shows that the number of 
non-lending products predicts the likelihood of a negotiation, but does not affect the result that relationships 
are less likely to negotiate an interest decrease. 
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important unobserved ways from firm which do not reach an agreement with the bank. To 
address these selection concern this paper uses a Heckman selection model to jointly 
estimate the likelihood of an agreement and the likelihood of negotiating an interest rate. 
In addition, the selection model enables to test hypothesis H.5 that banks are more likely 
to reach an agreement with relationships and that this likelihood is higher if the bank has 
positive private information about the firm. 
The firm's choice to reach an agreement with the bank depends on firm 
characteristics, relationship characteristics and the characteristics of the first offer of the 
bank. Let Ii be the observable characteristics that determine that the firm and the bank 
reach an agreement; for instance, the firm’s credit rating, its total assets and the first offer 
interest rate. Agreements are observable and recorded by the variable, agreementi, which 
describes the following selection equation: 
 
 
agreementi =               (3) 
 
 
where εi are the characteristics of negotiation i which are unobservable but affect whether 
the negotiation results in an agreement and might also affect the firm’s choice to 
negotiate. The instrument used to estimate the selection equation is the application time, 
which is the time between the credit application and the first offer. The motivation for 
this instrument comes from discussions with loan officers who complain about 
bureaucratic delays in the application process, for example due to illness of the 
supporting staff. The application time is a measure how quick the bank could make a first 
offer and if there are delays in the application, there is a chance that the firm already 
accepted a competing offer. The application time affects the decision of the firm to accept 
the offer because a long application time increases the probability that a firm accepted an 
offer from another bank, but does not affect the interest rate.
19
 The average application 
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 The application time might be correlated with credit risk because the approval of risky offers might take 
longer or because the bank processes applications of firms with possible outside options faster. To address 
0  if the firm does not reach an agreement with the bank: γ’Ii < εi, 





time for all firms which receive a first offer is 16 days and has a standard deviation of 17 
days. The following regression equation models the likelihood of an interest decrease: 
 
             Pr(interest decreasei) =  Ф (β1 relationshipi + β2 opaqueness + β3 Xi),               (4) 
 
where interest decreasei is a dummy which takes the value of one if the interest rate 
decreases over the negotiation and zero otherwise, Ф is the standard normal cumulative 
distribution function and the β’s are the unknown parameters. The specification is similar 
to equation (2). The selection equation (3) and the regression equation (4) are jointly 
estimated with maximum likelihood. 
 Table VI reports the results of the selection model and shows that the coefficient 
on the instrument, the application time, is negative and significant as predicted. A one 
standard deviation increase in the application time reduces the likelihood of an agreement 
with 4 percentage points, which shows that the application time is an important 
determinant of agreements. The test statistic reported at the bottom of the table is the 
result of the Wald test which tests the hypothesis that the error terms of the selection and 
regression equation are uncorrelated (Rho = 0). The results show that the null hypothesis 
of independent errors could not be rejected, which implies that the error terms of the 
selection equation and the regression equation are not correlated. This implies that the 
results of the previous section are not driven by unobserved firm characteristics 
correlated with one of the explanatory variables.  
Apart from the correction for a potential selection bias, the result of the selection 
equation could provide additional evidence on the determinants of bargaining power. 
Firm bargaining power should not only affect the likelihood of a negotiation, but also the 
likelihood that the firm reaches an agreement with the bank. Firms with more outside 
options, and therefore more bargaining power, are less likely to reach an agreement than 
firms with just one offer. The results in column (1) and (2) show that most of the 
coefficients on the variables in the selection and regression equation have opposite signs. 
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For example, relationships, as predicted by H.5., are more likely to reach an agreement 
with the bank and less likely to negotiate an interest decrease. Both findings provide 
evidence that relationships have less bargaining power in the credit market. Similarly, 
smaller and younger firms are more likely to reach an agreements and less likely to 
negotiate an interest decrease. Firms with debt from other banks are less likely to reach 
an agreement, because they are more likely to have an outside option of the other bank. 
The potential winner’s curse could explain why these firms are less likely to negotiate an 
interest decrease with the bank. 
 One empirical prediction of the “informational capture” theories is that “bad” 
firms are more likely to switch to another bank than “good” firms. The evidence 
presented in Table VI is mixed. The paper finds that firms with a good reputation are 
more likely to reach an agreement. If other competing banks could not observe the 
reputation of the firm, the relationship bank could exploit offer them better terms than an 
outside bank, which increases the likelihood that the firm reaches an agreement with the 
bank. However, firms with a bad customer risk grade based on their credit line usage and 
transaction account behavior are more likely to reach an agreement. Informational 
capture theories predict that in particular bad firms are more likely to switch. The bad 
information captured by this measure includes limit violations and a decreasing turnover 
on the current account of the firm. One explanation for this finding is that some of this 
information is observable by outside banks, for example if an outside bank asks for a half 
year financial report. If these firm do not receive outside offers (an assumption of the 
informational capture theories) they have to accept the offer of their relationship bank.  
   
4. The effect of negotiations on the agreed interest rate 
A firm possesses bargaining power if the firm can affect the bargaining outcome in a way 
desirable for him. If the bargaining measures employed in the main sections of this paper 
actually capture the bargaining power of the firms, negotiating firms should pay a lower 
interest rate than similar firms which accept the first offer. The main goal of this section 
is to test this hypothesis. Alternatively, loan officers could anticipate on the negotiation 





to finally and up at the desired interest rate. In this scenario, negotiating firms pay the 
same interest rate as similar firms which accept the first offer of the bank. The paper 
estimates the following specification to examine the impact of a negotiation on the agreed 
interest rate: 
 
                                                  ,                 (5) 
 
where                       is the all-in interest rate of the agreement, 
                  is a dummy which takes the value of one if the interest rate decreases 
over the negotiation (                ) and    is a matrix of covariates to control for 
differences in credit risk across the negotiations. The matrix of control variables includes 
firm characteristics (firm size, profitability, leverage, new credit demand and the demand 
for working capital) and relationship characteristics (lending relationship, debt from other 
banks, non-lending products). In addition, the specification includes 13 credit rating fixed 
effects, 13 industry fixed effects, 85 branch fixed effects and 11 year-quarter dummies. 
Each credit offer could include multiple facilities and since the errors of facilities within 
the same credit offer could be correlated, the paper clusters the standard errors at the 
credit offer level. 
Table VII shows in column (1) that negotiating firms pay an interest rate which is 
33 basis points lower than similar firms which accept the first offer of the bank, which is 
8 percent of the average first offer interest rate. Conversations with loan officers tell that 
“a quarter” (25 basis points) is a common discount they give in negotiations. According 
to one loan officer “less than a quarter does not move a firm and more than a quarter is a 
too large discount”. Therefore, the estimated magnitude of the discount is economically 
meaningful. In addition, the result shows that negotiating firms actually improve the 
terms of their credit offer, which is in line with the interpretation that interest changes 
reflect firm bargaining power.
20
 To test whether larger concessions also result in a lower 
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interest rate column (2) includes the change in the interest rate                and the 
square of the interest rate change to test for non-linear effects. The results show that for 
each interest decrease of 100 basis points the firms receives a 49 basis points discount 
compared with firms which accept the first offer of the bank. This suggests that 
negotiating firms receive a high first offer than similar firms which directly accept the 
first offer, but at the end, after negotiating are still better off than firms which accept the 
first offer. The square of the interest rate changes variable is positive a significant, which 
suggest that firms with a larger interest change receive a smaller discount. 
Does the negotiated discount differ across firms? To answer this question the 
paper tests whether relationships, firms with debt from outside banks, large firms and 
older firms receive a larger discount after a negotiation by interacting these variables with 
the interest decrease variable. Column (3) presents the results and shows that firms with 
debt from other banks receive a larger discount and larger firm receive a small er 
discount. One explanation for the first result is that firms only want to switch when the 
discount is interactive enough for them and compensates sufficient for the fixed 
switching costs. One explanation why larger firms receive a smaller discount is that their 
first is already more competitive which reduces the negotiation room of the bank. This 
explanation is consistent with the findings in Table IV.   
Credit negotiations determine the division of the surplus between the firm and the 
bank. The division of the surplus might also depend on the bargaining abilities of the loan 
officer. This would imply that the bargaining power measure does not capture firm, but 
loan officer bargaining power. The inclusion of loan officer fixed effect enables to test 
this hypothesis. If the interest decrease variable is correlated with unobserved loan officer 
characteristics, its coefficient would decrease in magnitude or become even insignificant 
after the inclusion of loan officer fixed effects. Column (4) shows that the inclusion of 
loan officer fixed effect increases the R-squared of the interest model from 77.1 percent 
to 78.4 percent. Since the specification already controls for differences in firm 
characteristics, this results suggest that unobserved loan officer characteristics, such as 
bargaining ability, affect the outcomes of the negotiation. However, the magnitude of the 





effects. This shows that firm bargaining power and not the bargaining ability of the loan 
officer drives the result.  
  
5. Conclusions 
This is the first paper which studies the negotiation process and bargaining behavior in 
the small business credit market. The paper uses a unique hand collected data set of 
18,591 credit negotiations between small firms and one large commercial bank in the 
Netherlands during the period January 2008 - December 2010 which include detailed 
information about the negotiation process. Studying the negotiation process provides 
novel evidence on the design of credit contracts and the distribution of bargaining power 
between firms and banks. For example, this paper shows that in a typical credit 
negotiation the firm and the bank first set the collateral requirements, which show the 
importance of collateral in the provision of credit to small firms. The paper also shows 
that relationships and opaque firms have less bargaining power in negotiations and banks 
use their privately collected information about their relationships to discriminate between 
“good” and “bad” which are observably equivalent to other banks which do not lend to 
these firms. Negotiating firms pay a 33 basis points lower interest rate than otherwise 





Figure 1: The distribution of interest decreases 
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Table I: Summary statistics 
Table I presents the summary statistics of the firm characteristics, the relationship characteristics and the 
credit demand and provides the mean, median and standard deviation (SD) for all 18,591 credit 
negotiations. The definitions of the variables can be found in Appendix I. 
 
 Mean Median SD 
Firm characteristics    
Total assets (€1000) 607 341 1,965 
Firm age < 3 years 0.05 0 0.23 
Firm age 3-8 years 0.19 0 0.39 
Firm age > 8 years 0.59 1 0.49 
Turnover (€1000) 913 356 3,849 
Corporation (0 – 1) 0.39 0 0.49 
Credit rating (1 – 7) 3.9 4.0 0.76 
    
Relationship characteristics    
Relationship (0/1) 0.66 1 0.47 
Relationship length (years) 6.7 2.5 8.63 
Debt from other banks (0/1) 0.24 0 0.43 
Good reputation 0.62 1 0.49 
Good customer risk grade 0.30 0 0.46 
Medium customer risk grade 0.05 0 0.22 
Bad customer risk grade 0.03 0 0.17 
    
Credit demand    
Credit demand (thousand euro) 227 145 251 
Real estate (%) 0.33 0 0.42 
Corporate investment (%) 0.20 0 0.33 
Working capital (%) 0.38 0.16 0.44 
Repayment debt from other banks (%) 0.06 0 0.21 









Table II: The setting of the credit terms of the first offer 
Table II presents the summary statistics of the setting of the credit terms of the first offer. Panel A presents 
the time to the last update of the collateral requirements (Collateral), the non-interest credit terms (e.g. size 
and maturity) of the individual credit lines and term loans (Facilities) and the interest rates and fees of the 
credit offer. The time to the last update is the time in days between the first meeting with the firm and the 
last update of the credit contract. Panel B presents the distribution of the order in which the credit terms are 
set during the negotiations, based on the last update of the credit term.  
 
Panel A: Time between the first meeting with the firm and the last update  
 Time to the last update (days) 
Credit term Mean Median 
Collateral 19.8 10.9 
Facilities 21.1 12.2 
Pricing 24.5 14.8 
 
 
Panel B: The order of the last update of the credit terms of the first offer 
 
   All No relationship Relationship 
First term Second term Last term % % % 
Collateral Facilities Pricing 86.7 62.7 97.7 
Facilities Collateral Pricing 13.2 37.2 2.2 
Other orders   0.1 0.1 0.1 





Table III: Negotiation summary statistics 
Table III presents the negotiation summary statistics. Panel A presents the summary statistics of the 18,591 first offers of the bank, which include 27,459 
new facilities. The table contains the credit terms of the facilities of the first offer and provides their mean, median and standard deviation. In addition, 
the table provides the mean credit terms of the agreements and the percentage of the agreement containing positive and negative changes of the specific 
credit term. Panel B presents the trade-offs between the interest rate and other credit terms. Panel C presents the distribution of the interest changes for 
all agreements and for the highest and lowest decile of the first offer interest rate.  
 
Panel A: Summary statistics of the first offer and the credit term changes 
   First offer  Agreements 
Variable name   Mean Median SD  Mean Credit term increase (%) Credit term decrease (%) 
Credit line (0/1)  0.37 0 0.48  0.37   
Facility size €1000  137 100 137  133 1.1 1.0 
Collateral ratio %  0.81 0.85 0.43  0.81 1.7 1.9 
Maturity years  6.7 5 7.15  6.5 0.5 0.5 
Covenants #  0.40 0 0.61  0.39 0.1 0.2 
Interest rate   bps  621 630 235  615 3.6 15.1 
Negotiation time  days      12.97   
Observations   27,459 (100%)  22,071 (80%) 
 
Panel B: Trade-offs between the interest rate and other credit terms (in percentages of the total number of agreements) 
 All agreements  Agreements with: 
   No non-credit 
term changes 
Facility size Collateral value Maturity Covenant 
   increase decrease increase decrease Increase decrease increase decrease 
No interest change 81.3  79.9 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Interest increase 3.6  2.5 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Interest decrease 15.1  12.7 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.9 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 
Total 100  95.1 1.1 1.0 1.7 1.9 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.2 
 
Panel C: The first offer and the likelihood of interest rate changes 
 Interest rate change (bps): 
 <-125 -125 -100 -75 -50 -25 0 25 50 75 100 125 125< 
All agreements 1.6 0.4 1.0 1.3 3.7 5.5 83.8 0.7 1.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 
            
First offer interest rate (bps)              
Highest decile (>500 bps) 5.4 0.9 2.1 1.8 3.0 1.8 83.5 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 
Lowest decile (<100 bps) 0 0 0.4 0.6 3.22 8.5 82.4 1.2 2.6 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 
69 
 
Table IV: The first offer interest rate 
First offer interest ratei =  β1Relationshipi + β2Opaquei  + β3Xi + εi   
Table IV presents the results from a regression with first offer interest ratei as dependent variable. The 
sample includes the 27,459 facilities of the 18,591 first offers. The first offer non-interest credit terms 
include the facility size, the collateral ratio, maturity and a credit line, fixed interest rate and installment 
dummy. The definitions of the independent variables can be found in Appendix I. In addition, the baseline 
specification includes 13 industry dummies and 55 region dummies and 11 year – quarter dummies. The 






 respectively . Standard errors are robust and clustered at credit offer level. 
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Loan officer fixed effects    YES 
First offer non-interest credit terms YES YES YES YES 
Industry,  credit rating FE YES YES YES YES 
Branch and year - quarter  FE YES YES YES YES 
     
Observations 27,459 27,459 27,459 27,459 
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Table V: The likelihood of an interest decrease 
Pr(interest decreasei ) = Ф (β1Relationshipi + β2Opaquei  + β3Xi) 
Table V presents the results from a regression with interest decrease as dependent variable. The sample includes the 22,071 facilities of the 15,376 
credit agreements. The first offer credit terms include the first offer interest rate, the facility size, the collateral ratio, maturity and a credit line, fixed 
interest rate and installment dummy. The definitions of the independent variables can be found in Appendix I. In addition, the baseline specification 
includes 13 industry dummies and 55 region dummies and 11 year – quarter dummies. The dependent variable is estimated with a probit model and the 






 respectively . Standard errors 
are robust and clustered at credit offer level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












 (0.91)  (1.74) (0.91) (0.91) (0.91) 
Relationship length  -0.87
***
     
  (0.32)     











 (0.72) (0.71) (0.73) (0.73) (0.72) (0.072) 
Good reputation   1.96    
   (1.30)    
Good customer risk grade   -0.08    
   (0.86)    
Medium customer risk grade   -3.02
**
    
   (0.03)    
Bad customer risk grade   -4.35
***
    
   (1.27)    














 (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) 
Firm age 1-3 years 1.98 0.27 1.91 1.97 2.07 1.96 
 (1.66) (1.45) (1.66) (1.66) (1.66) (1.66) 













 (0.14) (1.17) (1.41) (0.14) (1.40) (1.41) 






















Table V (Continued)       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Credit rating and credit term changes       
ΔCredit rating     -4.50   
    (3.58)   
ΔFacility size      0.05
***
  
     (0.01)  
ΔCollateral ratio     1.47  
     (6.52)  
ΔMaturity     -0.53  
     (0.41)  
ΔCovenants     -6.345  
     (4.37)  
ΔFunding costs     -0.28
***
  
     (0.03)  
Cross selling       
Cross selling      2.11
***
 
      (0.77) 
ΔCross selling      0.97 
      (0.21) 
First offer credit terms YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry,  credit rating, branch and 
year - quarter  FE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 22,122 22,122 22,122 22,122 22,122 22,122 
Pseudo-R
2 





0    if the firm does not reach an agreement with the bank: γ’Ii < εi, 
Table VI : The likelihood of an interest decrease, sample selection correction 
                 
 
 
Pr(interest decreasei ) = Ф (β1Relationshipi + β2Opaquei  + β3Xi) 
Table VI presents the results from the estimation of the likelihood of an interest decrease with a correction 
for the negotiations which do not result in an agreement, which might result in a sample-selection bias. To 
address this potential sample selection problem the paper estimates a Heckman selection model. The 
selection equation includes the application time as the identifying instrument, which is not included in the 
main estimation. The first offer credit terms include the first offer interest rate, the facility size, the 
collateral ratio, maturity and a credit line, fixed interest rate and installment dummy. The definitions of the 
independent variables can be found in Appendix I. In addition, the baseline specification includes 13 
industry dummies and 55 region dummies and 11 year – quarter dummies. Both the selection and 
regression equation are estimated by maximum likelihood estimation and the marginal effects are reported 
in percentage points. Rho is the correlation between the error terms of the selection and regression 
equation. The Wald test of independent equations tests the hypothesis that rho equals to zero. A significant 
Chi-square test statistics rejects the hypothesis that the error terms are uncorrelated and justifies the use of 







respectively. Standard errors are robust. 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
Equation: Selection  Regression  
Dependent variable: Agreement  Interest decrease 






 (1.16) (0.015) 









 (1.11) (1.13) 





 (0.57) (0.61) 





 (1.24) (1.34) 





 (1.86) (1.34) 






 (0.22) (2.63) 





 (1.19) (1.42) 





 (0.86) (1.26) 





 (0.82) (1.13) 










Table VI (Continued)   
   




 (0.21)  
First offer credit terms   
Industry,  credit rating, branch and year - quarter  FE Yes Yes 
   
Uncensored observations 27,459  
Censored observations 22,071  
Rho -0.013  
Wald test of independent equations (Rho = 0) Χ
2






Table VII: The effect of negotiations on the credit agreement 
                                                   
Table VII presents the results from a regression with the agreed interest rate as dependent variable. The 
sample includes the 22,071 facilities of the 15,376 credit agreements.  The firm characteristics include the 
firm size and the three firm age dummies. The relationship characteristics include the relationship and debt 
from other banks dummies. The agreed non-interest credit terms include the facility size, the collateral 
ratio, maturity and a credit line, fixed interest rate and installment dummy. The definitions of the 
independent variables can be found in Appendix I. The dependent variable is estimated with OLS. 






 respectively . Standard errors are 
robust and clustered at credit offer level. 
 








 (2.14)  (13.63) (13.69) 
Δ interest rate  0.49
***
   
  (0.02)   
Δ interest rate
   Δ interest rate (10-3)  0.58***   
  (0.08)   
Interest decrease  Relationship   -6.03 -11.52* 
   (6.04) (6.23) 
Interest decrease   Debt from other banks   -13.30*** -13.59** 
   (5.30) (5.59) 
Interest decrease   Firm size   6.34*** 4.61** 
   (2.31) (2.29) 
Interest decrease   Firm age 1-3 years   23.71 21.75 
   (13.43) (14.17) 
Interest decrease   Firm age 4-8 years   4.58 5.85 
   (9.67) (9.76) 
Interest decrease   Firm age > 8 years   6.39 7.27 
   (8.94) (9.00) 
     
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Relationship characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Agreed non-interest credit terms Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry,  credit rating, branch and year - 
quarter  FE Yes Yes Yes 
Yes 
Loan officer FE    Yes 
Observations 22,122 22,122 22,122 22,122 
R
2 






Appendix I: Variable definitions 
 
Variable name Definition 
Dependent variables  
First offer interest rate The first offer interest rate is the facility size weighted average interest rate 
of the credit agreement, in basis points. 
Interest decrease = 1 if the interest rate change between the first offer and the agreement is 
negative and 0 otherwise. 
Agreed interest rate The agreed interest rate is the facility size weighted average interest rate of 
the credit agreement, in basis points. 
Default = 1 if the firm defaults on its obligations within 12 months after the 
origination and 0 otherwise. 
Independent variables  
Relationship = 1 if the firm has an existing relationship with the bank and 0 otherwise. 
Relationship length The length of the relationship between the firm and the bank in years. 
Debt from other banks = 1 if the firm has debt from other banks and  0 otherwise. 
Non-lending products = 1 if the firm purchases non-lending products from the bank and 0 
otherwise. 
Good reputation = 1 if the loan officer reports that the firm keeps past agreements there are 
good experiences with the firm and zero otherwise. 
Good customer risk grade = 1 if the customer risk grade, which is a credit rating based on the credit 
line usage and the transaction account behavior, equals 1 or 2 and 0 
otherwise. 
Medium customer risk grade = 1 if the customer risk grade, which is a credit rating based on the credit 
line usage and the transaction account behavior, equals 3 and 0 otherwise. 
Bad customer risk grade = 1 if the customer risk grade, which is a credit rating based on the credit 
line usage and the transaction account behavior, equals 4, 5 or 6 and 0 
otherwise. 
Total assets  Total assets from the latest annual report, in thousand euro. 
Firm age 1-3 years = 1 if the firm age is between 1 and 3 years and 0 otherwise. 
Firm age 4-8 years = 1 if the firm age is between 4 and 8 years and 0 otherwise. 
Firm age > 8 years = 1 if the firm age is higher than 8 years. 
Facility size Size of the credit facility, in thousand euro. 
Collateral ratio Collateral value / total credit volume. 
Maturity The maturity of the facility, in years. 
Credit line = 1 if the facility is a credit line and 0 otherwise. 
Fixed interest rate = 1 if the facility has a fixed interest rate and 0 otherwise. 
Installment = 1 if the facility includes installment payments and 0 otherwise 
Application time The application time is the time between the day of the credit application 
and the day of the first offer, in days. 
Other variables  
Employees  Number of employees of the firm, in full-time equivalents. 
Profitability EBIT / total assets. 
Debt-to-assets ratio Total liabilities / total assets. 
New credit demand  
New credit demand is the firm’s demand for new loans and does not 
include the existing debt of the firm or renewals, in thousand euro. 
Credit demand for fixed assets  
Credit demand for fixed assets is the firm’s credit demand for fixed assets 
as share of the new credit demand.  
Credit demand for working 
capital  
Credit demand for fixed assets is the firm’s credit demand for working 





















We show that the collection of soft information on the activities of small and medium 
sized enterprises and the exercising of loan officer discretion helps in monitoring these 
borrowers. We measure loan officer discretion as the deviations in granted loan amounts 
from the amounts stemming from the bank’s own credit scoring model. Soft information 
guides discretion, and helps in predicting loan default even when controlling for all 
available public and private information. Loan officers use soft information when 
deciding on the loan amount that is being granted: A one standard deviation of more 
favourable soft information results in the granting of a 16 percent higher loan amount. 
Beyond using soft information, loan officer discretion per se neither improves nor 


















Banks - and not investors in capital markets - typically finance small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs). Extant theory suggests banks are able monitors of these firms (e.g., 
Diamond (1984), Boot (2000)), and can impede firm risk-shifting during normal times 
and mitigate losses in case of default (Holmström and Tirole (1997)). Yet, despite this 
prominent role attributed to bank monitoring in the theoretical literature, surprisingly 
little hard evidence documents its existence, contours and importance. 
Using a unique data set that contains detailed information on bank monitoring 
activities (through their loan officers) at the loan origination stage and during the course 
of the bank-firm lending relationship, we investigate how bank monitoring controls risk-
shifting and loss-mitigation, and impacts loan-level outcomes, and firm-level risk and 
income for the bank. The level of detail present in our data set allows us to observe 
whether the bank anchors its loan granting and condition setting in quantifiable hard 
information (e.g., a firm’s leverage ratio), soft information (e.g., a subjective impression 
of the managerial ability of the firm’s owner),
 
or discretion exercisable by its loan 
officers (e.g., the possibility for loan officers to grant more money to the firm than the 




It is well-known that hard information is a major determinant in many lending 
decisions. Soft information, however, may also play an important role in many of such 
decisions. Decisions on loans to SMEs for example are often based on the detailed 
knowledge about their operational environment. Relationship banks invest in obtaining 
proprietary customer-specific information by evaluating the customers through multiple 
interactions over time (Boot, 2000). Furthermore, loan officers often enjoy the authority 
in determining lending terms such as the loan size and the loan rate. 
                                                 
1
 Petersen (2004) defines hard information as information which is quantitative, easy to store and 
transmittable in impersonal ways, and which content is independent of the collection process. Soft 
information is subjective, difficult to quantify and often stored in text form. Soft information is collected 
personally and the decision maker is often the same person as the information collector. Shavell (2007) 





Both soft information and loan officer discretion may be valuable as inputs at the 
loan origination stage and during monitoring (e.g., Stein, 2002). The contents of the 
employed soft information however is difficult to verify and may lead to related lending 
depending upon the loan officer’s compensation scheme and the degree of competition 
(Heider and Inderst, 2011), while decisions to exert discretion may put a loan officer’s 
reputational capital at stake. In our setting, the use of discretion by loan officers is easily 
verifiable by headquarters. We therefore address the question whether the use of soft 
information and the exercise of discretion by loan officers is valuable to a financial unit 
by studying if and how loans based upon soft information and discretion have more 
favorable outcomes than otherwise similar loans. 
To address this question properly one needs access to proprietary bank data on 
loan initiations and monitoring over the course of a bank-firm relationship. Existing 
research focuses mainly on the role of soft information and discretion at the screening 
stage, when a bank accepts or rejects a loan application, and its effects on bank risk (e.g., 
Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010b, Grunert and Norden, 2012, Puri, Rocholl and Steffen, 
2011, and Gropp, Gruendl and Guettler, 2013). Our paper contributes to this nascent 
important literature by studying the impact of direct measures of soft information and 
loan officer discretion on lending outcomes over the entire course of a bank-firm lending 
relationship. 
That soft information about SMEs, i.e., in many cases its handful of direct 
owners, matters for loan outcomes is self-evident for retail bankers. Character (integrity, 
honesty) and capacity (management ability) are considered as the two most important 
categories among the so-called “5C’s of credit”,
2
 and soft information is at least essential 
if not the only way to assess it. Discretion allows the loan officer to tailor the loan 
contract terms to the firm, such that firm performance is maximized. 
We investigate how valuable soft information and loan officer discretion are in 
lending decisions. To this end, we use a hand-collected panel data set on the credit 
                                                 
2
 This is a long-established practice in the U.S. banking industry to assess the creditworthiness of a 
borrower by examining five categories. Capital, collateral and conditions (in industry and economy) are the 






approvals and monitoring activities of a SME lending division of a bank over a six-year 
period. In particular, we extract indicators of soft information and loan officer discretion 
from ‘customer evaluation forms’ a loan officer completes during the credit application 
and the (typically annual) loan monitoring cycle.
3
 
First, we classify the information in these forms into public, private hard and 
(private) soft information. Soft information comprises information: i) that the loan officer 
collected via personal interaction, and ii) for which human cognition is required to 
convert it into actionable intelligence. We create an aggregate measure of soft 
information and argue that this measure of soft information is a good proxy for the actual 
soft information possessed by the loan officer. We employ this unique and direct measure 
of soft information to investigate how valuable it is in determining loan conditions, 
monitoring, and predicting outcomes such as loan defaults. 
Second, we study the determinants of loan officer discretion and investigate how 
loan officer discretion affects lending outcomes. Our dataset provides a direct measure of 
loan officer discretion. In particular, at loan origination as well as during each monitoring 
cycle, the information from the ‘customer evaluation form’ is put into the bank’s internal 
credit scoring model that yields a Model Limit. This model limit employs different types 
of information (i.e., public, private hard and soft information). However, the loan officer 
has the authority to deviate from the model limit and propose a larger or smaller 
maximum exposure relative to this model limit. We label the deviations from the model 
limit as “discretion” by the loan officer. A unique property of our analysis is that loan 
officer not only decide on accept/reject decisions (the extensive margin) but also on the 
maximum exposure (the intensive margin). 
                                                 
3
 Soft information is subjective and inherently difficult to quantify. The empirical literature up to now 
mostly resorts to indirect measures, such as the distance between bank and borrower, the presence of 
review notes by the loan officer (Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010a), the personal interaction between a bank 
and borrower, or the length of the bank-borrower relationship (see e.g., Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and 
Stein, 2005). Agarwal and Hauswald (2010b) regress an internal bank credit score on public information 
indicators and employ the residual as a proxy for soft information. Similarly, loan officer discretion is 







With these direct measures of soft information and loan officer discretion, we first 
investigate whether loan officers employ soft information in their lending decisions in 
addition to the public and private hard information that is available, and whether it 
determines loan performance and size. We find that a worsening of the soft information 
by one standard deviation worse increases the probability of default by 5.5 percent. Soft 
information therefore significantly helps in predicting loan default, even after controlling 
for public and private hard information. While soft information is largely uncorrelated 
with public and private hard information, its economic relevancy in predicting defaults is 
of an equal magnitude as that of public information. This finding suggests that soft 
information is an important additional factor in the determination of the creditworthiness 
of a borrower above and beyond public and private hard information. 
We further find that a one standard deviation more favorable soft information 
results in a 4 percent increase in discretion, i.e., the deviation from the model limit 
determined by the credit scoring model. Remarkably, public and private hard information 
do not explain discretion. The overall impact of a one standard deviation change of our 
measure of soft information results in a 16 percent change in loan size. We do not find 
evidence that loans based upon more loan officer discretion perform differently than 
loans based on the credit scoring model only. 
In sum, we show that soft information is an important part of the information set 
used in determining the creditworthiness of a borrower and that soft information is 
economically at least as relevant as other information employed during monitoring and 
screening, i.e., public and private hard information. Discretion is driven by a loan 
officer’s soft information about the firm. Furthermore, loan officers employ discretion to 
smoothen shocks resulting from changes in the application of the model limit. Although 
our soft information indicator explains discretion, we do not find that discretionary 
choices themselves improve lending outcomes. 
Our results show that soft information and loan officer discretion are correlated 
with lending outcomes.  Our results are further robust to reverse causality concerns as the 
insights also hold for firms in which the bank is only a small lender, i.e., when the firm 





The papers closest to ours are Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2011) and Gropp, 
Gruendl and Guettler (2013) and Brown, Schaller, Westerfeld and Heusler (2012). The 
first paper also studies the role of soft information and discretion in accept/reject 
decisions. In particular, they investigate deviations from a commonly implemented credit 
scoring model across savings banks in accept/reject decisions. They call these deviations 
decided by loan officers ‘discretion’. Soft information drives discretion mainly for 
customers without credit history, whereas hard information drives it for consumers with a 
credit history. Accepted loans based on discretion do not perform differently than loans 
accepted on the basis of the scoring model. 
Gropp, Gruendl and Guettler (2013) investigate the use of discretion by 
relationship and transaction banks. Discretion is measured as the rating upgrades or 
downgrades by banks relative to a commonly implemented model and these are argued to 
be based on soft information. They find that firms self-select relationship banks 
depending on the quality of their soft information. 
Brown, Schaller, Westerfeld and Heusler (2012) use the loan officers’ 
adjustments of small firm credit ratings as measure of discretion. They show that loan 
officers use discretion to smooth credit ratings over time to insure their relationship 
against fluctuations in lending conditions.     
The first two papers look at the extensive margin of discretion in accept/reject 
decisions for consumer loans, we analyze the intensive margin for SME loans. The 
intensive margin may actually often be more relevant for firms once they have 
established a relationship with a particular bank. In our case the maximum exposure may 
deviate from the model limit as a result of the loan officer’s discretion. We show that this 
type of discretion is important, and that there is both positive and negative discretion. 
More importantly, our set-up also allows us to control for any unobserved heterogeneity 
by looking at the changes in soft information and discretion over time, something which 
is typically not possible with accept/reject decisions only. Similar to their work though, 
we find that soft information partially explains the use of discretion and that discretion is 
more often used for collateralized loans. We also find that loans where discretion leads to 





do not perform differently than loans based on the credit scoring model only. While 
Brown, Schaller, Westerfeld and Heusler (2012) show that discretion is primary used to 
insure bank relationships, we find in addition that loan officers use discretion to 
incorporate soft information in their lending decisions. This   shows that repeated 
interactions enable lenders to incorporate soft information in lending decisions, as 
relationship lending theories argue (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, 
the bank’s lending and information collection process, our hardened soft information and 
discretion indicators. Section 3 describes the results. The final section concludes. 
 
2. Data   
In this section we document the data, the bank’s monitoring process, and our empirical 
measures of soft information and discretion.  
 
2.1 The Data 
We use internal bank data come from the SME lending division of a multinational bank 
in Argentina. We have data since the foundation of this SME lending division in 1995 to 
2001.
4
 For each client the bank maintains a credit folder that contains all documents and 
forms employed by the loan officer since inception of the loan and during monitoring of 
the firm over the course of the lending relationship. We observe multiple monitoring 
cycles (i.e., credit revisions) for each firm over time since the inception of the bank-firm 
relationship.
5
 We construct a panel data set of all evaluation points for all clients (640 
firms) during the 7 year sample period.
6
 In total we observe 2,501 evaluation points with 
on average 4 evaluation points per firm. 
 
                                                 
4
 The Argentinean financial crisis started in November 2001 at the end of our sample period and therefore 
does not affect our results. 
5
 The SME lending division was founded in 1995 and “inherited” only 31 existing clients from other 
divisions in the bank. The other 95 percent of the clients we observe are therefore new to the bank since 
1995. 
6
 The firms have an average total asset size of 11.8 million dollars, an average return on assets of 7.4 





2.2 The Screening and Monitoring Process 
The loan officer collects information about the firm at the inception of the lending 
relationship and at each credit revision. He visits the firm and talks with its owners, but 
also interacts with the firm’s main customers and suppliers to collect information about 
the firm’s creditworthiness. The standard customer evaluation form (0) is filled out and 
summarizes the collected data. This form typically contains 40 “measures” that 
summarize information about the firm’s creditworthiness. Each variable has a minimum 
of 1 (bad) and a maximum of 4 (good). We use these measures to construct our indicators 
of soft, public and private hard information, which we discuss in the next subsection. 
The loan officer could use discretion via two channels. Firstly, the loan officer 
could upgrade the model credit rating of the rating model if the loan officer beliefs that 
the firm has a better creditworthiness than the model credit rating. Second, the loan 
officer could use discretion by deviating from the model limit to set the maximum 
exposure of the bank to the firm.
7
  The maximum exposure is determined in two steps. 
First, the credit scoring model employing public, private hard and soft information leads 
to a model limit. Second, the loan officer can either follow the model limit or employ his 
discretion to deviate from this model limit and set a different maximum exposure. Thus, 
the loan officer has the discretion to choose the model limit, or to positively or negatively 
deviate from the model limit. 
Figure 2 shows a scatter plot of the model limit against the maximum exposure as 
determined by the loan officers. In 64 percent of the cases the loan officer follows the 
model limit (the 45 degree line), in 22 percent of the cases the loan officer uses “negative 
discretion” (i.e., the maximum exposure is lower than the model limit) and in 14 percent 
of the cases the loan officer uses “positive discretion” (i.e., the maximum exposure is 
larger than the model limit). We will show that the “discretion” exerted by loan officers is 
partly driven by their soft information. By deviating from the model limit, a loan officer 
is more likely to put his own reputation at risk. A loan officer can more easily be held 
accountable for this discretion as their supervisor easily can identify it and inquire why 
                                                 
7
 The maximum exposure is the maximum size of all short term, long term, covered and uncovered loans, 





there was a deviation from the model limit. This risk of accountability is lower when the 
loan officer thinks highly about the firm, i.e., when he has favorable soft information. We 
use this unique feature of the data to test whether our measure of soft information 
explains loan officer discretion. 
 
2.3 Measurement of Public, Private Hard and Soft Information 
We study which type of information predicts default and determines lending outcomes. 
Table I presents the description of the public, private hard and soft information measures, 
the data sources and the summary statistics. Each variable has a minimum of 1 (bad) and 
a maximum of 4 (good) and the measure averages range from 2.25 to 3.99. Their standard 
deviations range from 0.00 to 1.36. The customer evaluation form employed by the bank 
differs across industries. While most measures are part of every form (e.g., whether a 
firm has previously been in a Chapter 11 procedure), some are industry specific (e.g., the 
fleet size of a transportation company).  
Since we do no observe the same information measures for each credit evaluation 
we aggregate the individual information measures. To aggregate the measures, we divide 
the information collected in the customer evaluation form at the credit revisions into three 
types: public, private hard and soft information. We categorize information which is 
available to all potential lenders to a specific firm as “public”. Examples are information 
from the credit registry and accounting data. We label information which is quantitative 
bank specific information as “private (hard)”. Examples include the firm’s repayment 




We use two criteria to identify “soft” information. The first criterion is that the 
information is collected through personal interaction with the borrower or its 
stakeholders. The second criterion is that human cognition is required to convert the 
                                                 
8
 Mester, Nakamura and Renault (2007) and Norden and Weber (2010) show that banks employ 
information about transaction account activity and credit line usage in their loan monitoring. This 
transaction information is quantitative, but only available internally in the bank. Therefore we classify this 





information into decision-relevant information.
9
 To evaluate the first criterion, the bank 
documented the process how each variable was collected by a loan officer. For example, 
the bank explained that for the collection of the variable Track Record with Main 
Suppliers a loan officer would typically call suppliers to collect information about the 
firm’s reputation and payment behavior of the trade credit. 
To evaluate the second criterion we identify on the customer evaluation form 
(Figure 1) for which measures human cognition is required to enter the information. For 
some measures there are formal rules to translate information into an A to D score. For 
example, the debt-sales ratio gets a score of ‘A’ if this ratio is lower than 20 percent. 
However, other measures do not have such formal rules and are more subjective in 
nature. For example, the quality and reliance of information could be scored as ‘strong’, 
‘positive’, ‘neutral’ or ‘negative’. We identify measures without formal rule as measures 
which require human cognition. If the measure requires these two criteria – i.e, personal 
interaction and human cognition – we conclude that the measure is hardened soft 
information produced by the loan officer. Table I shows for each measure the source of 
the information, which could be the loan officer, internal bank data, accounting data of 
the firm or information from the central bank credit register. For each measure we also 
indicate whether human cognition is required to collect the measure.  
Using the classification criteria describe above, we classify 13 measures as public 
information, 19 measures as private information and 8 measures as soft information 
measures. To aggregate these three information types we employ three methods to 
compute these aggregate indicators. The first is the equally weighted average of all 
measures for each information type labeled as “average information”. The second 
employs the minimum score over all measures within an information type, labeled as 
“minimum”. The third is a weighted average of all measures for each information type 
(we weigh each measure with its variance) labeled as “weighted information”. The three 
aggregation methods are basically different weighting methods for the individual 
informations measures. The average information method puts an equal weight on each 
                                                 
9
 Agarwal and Hauswald (2010a) use the term ‘subjective intelligence” to describe the subjective 
evaluation of the loan officer. This interpretation is close to our criterion that human cognition is required 





information measure, the minimum method puts all the weight on the measure with the 
minimum score and the weighted method puts more weight on measures with a high 
within firm standard deviation. The idea behind the last method is that information 
measures which vary more within the same firm contain more information about the 
changes in the actual creditworthiness of the firm.    
Panel A of Table II presents the summary statistics of the aggregate information 
indicators. Since all information variables have a range from 1 (bad) to 4 (good) the mean 
values of the information indicators range from 2.45 to 3.71. Their standard deviations 
range from 0.34 to 1.11. The last column “sd within” shows that also soft information 
does not only vary across firms, but also within firms. Panel B presents the correlation 
coefficients between the public, private and soft information indicators. The correlation 
with the average soft indicator with the average public and private hard information is 
0.21 and 0.08, respectively. These low correlations are surprising because a firm manager 
who is capable is expected to run his business and thus higher observable financial 
performance indicators. In the next section we will investigate in detail the potential 
explanations for this low correlation. 
There are four explanations for this low correlation. The first explanation is that 
soft information substitutes public and private information when there is not sufficient 
public and private information available. We find that the number of soft information 
variables is negatively correlated with the number of private information variables and 
positively with the number of public information measures. This suggests that soft 
information could partly substitute a lack of private information, while more public 
information is also associated with more soft information.
 10
 Secondly, soft information 
could be uncorrelated with hard information contemporary, but predict hard information 
over time. To test this we estimate whether soft information collected in the previous 
period predict the levels and the changes in private and public information today. We find 
that past soft information predicts both changes in public information, but past public 
                                                 
10
 We estimate the number of soft information variables collected by the loan officer and report the results 





information predicts also change in soft information.
11
 This suggests that soft and public 
information are both an independent and noisy signal about the creditworthiness of the 
firm and explains why they are uncorrelated. In section 0 we investigate in detail which 
of these signals is more precise and is better in predicting defaults. Third, part of the low 
correlation is mechanical. The information variables could take the value of 1 to 4, which 
coarsifies the information. This is the last reason for a low correlation. 
Table II presents the summary statistics of the lending measures. The maximum 
exposure and the average model limit are slightly more than 1.2 million dollar. We rely 
on internal bank information for our loan delinquency indicator and employ three 
different measures of delinquency. The first measure is labeled Default. It takes the value 
of 1 in the first period that the firm repays the principal or interest rate late, and equals 0 
otherwise. In the empirical analysis we exclude firms once they have defaulted. This 
reduces our sample to 1,756 observations of which 10 percent of the firms default on 
their loan. We use default as our primary delinquency measure. As alternative proxies of 
delinquency, we use Loan Loss Provision, the percentage of the maximum exposure on 
which a loan loss provision is made.  
 
3. Empirical results 
This section presents our empirical results. We first investigate whether soft information 
predicts loan defaults. Secondly, we examine whether soft information determines loan 
officers’ discretion and evaluate the economic relevancy of soft information in the 
determination of the maximum exposure. Finally, we investigate whether loans with 
discretion perform differently than otherwise similar loans. 
 
3.1 Does soft information help to predict loan default? 
The collection of information by banks reduces the information asymmetry between the 
bank and the firm. Each piece of information collected is valuable to the bank if it 
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 We estimate whether the lags of the soft, private and public information indicators predict the current 
levels of the indicators and secondly whether the difference between the lagged information indicators 





improves the predictability of lending outcomes, i.e., the loan delinquency. Therefore we 
firstly test whether information indicators of public, private hard and soft information 
predict loan delinquencies through the following specification:   
 
                                             ,     (1) 
 
where Delinquencyit is Default or Loan Loss Provision of firm i at time t, Ф(.) is the 
standard normal cumulative distribution function, Softit is the soft information indicator, 
Priit is the private hard information indicator, Pubit is the public information indicator and 
Xit a matrix of control variables. We only include the firms in our sample which never 
defaulted before t. 
Secondly we investigate whether changes in information indicators predict the 
delinquency indicators of the firm. We estimate the first difference of (2): 
     
 
                                                               (2) 
 
where ΔDelinquencyit is the first difference of our delinquency indicator (Default, or 
Loan Loss Provision), Ф(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, 
ΔSoftit, ΔPriit, and ΔPubit  are the lagged first differences of the soft, private hard and 
public information indicators, respectively. Xit is a matrix of control variables which 
includes time fixed effects and the first difference of the information set dummies.
12
 In 
most specifications, we include firm size fixed effects, industry dummies, and loan 
officer fixed effects. The latter set of fixed effects should remove any idiosyncratic 
effects related to the behavior of a specific loan officer. We estimate equations (1) and (2) 
with Probit or OLS and cluster the standard errors at firm level. We report the marginal 
effects of the Probit estimations. 
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 Since we only include firms which never default before t, the delinquency measure in (2) is equal to the 





Table III presents the results of the estimations of (1). We find a highly significant 
marginal effect of the soft information indicator. Model (1) for example shows that a one 
standard deviation worsening in the average soft information indicator from its mean 
increases the probability of default with 5.5 percentage points.
13
 Public information also 
helps in predicting default: A one standard deviation decrease in public information 
increases the probability of default with 4 percentage points.
14
 Average private hard 
information in contrast does not help in predicting default.
15
 The loan officer collects the 
soft information and the quality of the soft information could reflect the ability of the loan 
officer. To test this we include loan officer fixed effects in Model (2) and show variation 
in soft information within the firms in the portfolio of one loan officer explains defaults. 
This suggests that the informational content of soft information and not the quality of the 
loan officer explains defaults. Model (4) employs the alternative measures of loan 
delinquency, loan loss provision. A one standard deviation decrease in soft information 
increases the loan loss provision with 5.5 percentage points. 
Table IV presents the results of the estimation of specification (2) where we 
explain the change in default by lagged first differences of public, private hard and soft 
information. In this way we control for firm fixed effects and compare the impact of 
changes over time in information indicators for a given firm. We find that a one standard 
deviation decrease in the change in soft information for a given firm increases the 
probability of default with 3 percentage points. A one standard deviation decrease in our 
measure of public information also increases the probability of default with 3 percentage 
points. Thus, our previous results are not only driven by cross-sectional heterogeneity 
across firms but also by within-firm time-series variation: Changes in soft information for 
a given firm predict loan default and this with an equal magnitude as public information 
does. This suggests that soft information is an important source of information in the 
monitoring of a firm as it determines loan outcomes. 
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 The unconditional probability of default in this sub-sample is 10.0 percent. 
14
 These findings are robust to taking the minimum or the weighted information indicators. 
15
 We do find that individual private information which reflects the payment behaviour of the firm does 







3.2 Causality: Do Banks Cause or Predict Defaults? 
The information collected by the bank could be helpful in predicting default. However, 
banks could also cause firms to default by setting loan terms that are not in line with the 
firm’s repayment capacity and therefore trigger a firm’s bankruptcy. We already partly 
deal with this concern by employing several loan delinquency indicators, in particular 
credit rating and loan loss provisions that in time come before any legal action of the 
bank and which therefore should not be driven by any legal action of the bank. 
We further implement two strategies to address the causality concern. First, a 
borrower could default because the bank was over-lending such that the loan size and 
interest burden exceed the firm’s repayment ability. Therefore we include the logarithm 
of the change in the maximum exposure in the previous period as a control variable.
16
 
The results in Model (5) of 0 and Model (5) of Table IV show that an increase in the 
maximum exposure in the previous monitoring cycle is negatively correlated with 
default. This reduces the concern that over-lending of banks pushes firms into default. 
Second, we run the regressions with the sub-sample of firms with multiple relationships 
as this reverse causality issue is less likely to play a role when the bank is only one of 
multiple lenders. The results of these regressions are reported in Model (6) of 0 and 
Model (6) of Table IV. Our result that soft information predicts loan delinquency still 
holds and if anything is even stronger. 
 
3.3 Is Soft Information Used by Loan Officers? 
In the previous section we show that soft information helps in predicting loan outcomes: 
Both the levels and first differences of soft information predict loan delinquencies. If soft 
information is valuable, do loan officers actually use information in their decisions on 
loan terms? In this subsection we study whether soft information explains loan officers’ 
discretion. 
 
                                                 
16









                                                               ,   (1)      
 
Where              is the logarithm of the Maximum exposureit and the variables 
positive discretionit and negative discretionit which take the value of 1 if the Maximum 
exposureit is higher (lower) than the Model limitit, Soft, Pri, Pub are our “average” 
information types and     is a matrix of other explanatory variables that determine 
discretion. The control variables include includes 6 year dummies, 3 firm sales size based 
dummies, 31 industry dummies and 21 regional dummies. We estimate equation (3) with 
OLS and Probit and cluster the standard errors at firm level.  
Table V presents the results. We firstly estimate the total effect of soft 
information on the Maximum exposureit. Column (1) shows that one standard deviation 
increase in soft information increases the maximum exposure with 20 percent, while a 
one standard deviation increase in public information increases the loan size with 15 
percent. This shows that in addition to public information soft information has an 
economically significant impact on the maximum exposure of the bank to the firm. The 
bank uses the information variables to calculate a model credit rating. However, loan 
officers could use discretion to upgrade the model credit rating if they expect that the 
creditworthiness of the firm is better than the model’s estimate. Column (2) shows that an 
Upgrade of the loan officer increases the maximum exposure of the firm with 33 percent. 
The effect of this form of loan officer discretion on the maximum exposure is significant. 
In the next section we analyze whether these upgrades are correlated with lower defaults 
to analyze whether this discretion is productive.   
What is the impact of soft information on the decision of the loan officer to 
deviate from the model limit? To answer this question we add the model limit to the 
specification and present the results in column (3). The results show that soft information 
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 We exclude observations for which the model limit is zero. The model limit is zero when the firm has 
defaulted or is near default. Discretion then is driven by other factors such as the fact that the bank has an 





continues to play an important role, even though some of the soft information partially 
determines the model limit. We also find that public information does not explain 
deviations from the model limit. The effect of the upgrades is not significant anymore 
because the credit rating after the upgrades is used to calculate the model limit.  
An important finding in the literature on the impact of relationships on lending is 
that relationships increase the availability of credit (e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 1994). To 
assess the effect of relationships we include four relationship measures to the 
specification: Inception, Relationship length, VIP and Outstanding. The variable 
Inception measures whether the credit evaluation is the inception of the bank firm lending 
relationship, Relationship length measures the length of the lending relationship in years, 
VIP is a dummy variable which captures whether the bank identifies the firm as an 
important customer and could be interpreted as a measure of the scope of the relationship 
and Outstanding measures the actual outstanding exposure to the firm. We report the 
result in column (4) and show that loan officers set a higher exposure at the inception of 
the relationship and for important (VIP) customers. The length of the relationship does 
not affect the exposure to the firm.  
The hierarchical structure of the bank might affect the use of discretion. We 
include three dummies which control for the approval level of the maximum exposure. 
We find that the approval level explain discretion but does not change the results. In 
addition we also include loan officer fixed effects and show that loan officer fixed effect 
explain discretion but does not affect the results. 
 Is there a difference between positive and negative discretion. To investigate this 
question we estimate the likelihood of positive and negative discretion. We show that 
relationship length does explains positive discretion and outstanding as predicted. A 
higher model limit negatively explains positive discretion. Negative discretion could be 







3.4 Discretion and Loan Performance? 
Soft information helps to predict loan delinquencies and loan officers partially employ 
soft information in their discretionary authority. The final question we are after is the role 
of discretion for loan delinquencies. In particular, we want to investigate whether loans 
granted with more discretion perform any differently than otherwise similar loans. We 
study two form of discretion: first the decision of the loan officer to upgrade the model 
credit rating and second the decision of the loan officer to deviate from the mode limit.  
Table VI reports the results. In column (1) we include the model credit rating and 
the upgrade variable. A worse credit rating increases the probability of a delinquency, but 
in addition an upgrade decrease the probability of default with 3.4 percentage points. This 
suggests that loan officers use upgrades if the model gives the firm a too conservative 
credit rating. We showed the upgrade explain discretionary lending decisions and that 
these upgrades predict defaults. This suggests that the first form of discretion is 
productive. In column (2) we include the maximum exposure and the model limit. If the 
loan officer sets a high maximum exposure relative to the model limit, the likelihood of a 
delinquency increases, which suggests that discretion works counterproductive. However, 
if we include the relationship variables in column (3), the results shows that the 
outstanding credit amount of the firm drives this result. The loan officer is forced to use 
positive discretion if the firm has a higher outstanding credit amount than the model limit. 
When controlling for the outstanding amount we find that the second type of discretion is 
not related with the probability of a delinquency. We find similar results in column (4) 
when using the loan loss provision as dependent variable. The results suggest that the 
upgrades of the credit rating improve the predictability of the model, while deviations 
from the model limit are not correlated with the probability of a delinquency. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we address the question whether the collection of soft information and the 
use of discretion by loan officers generate value for the bank. We study whether loans 
based upon soft information and discretionary authority by loan officers has more 





hardened soft information using the credit folders of a SME division of an international 
financial institution. We find that soft information predicts delinquencies in addition to 
public and private hard information. 
We further find that soft information is not only valuable in predicting defaults, 
but is also actually used by loan officers. We analyze the observed deviations from the 
credit scoring model to test whether loan officers actually rely on soft information in 
wielding their discretionary authority. Soft information indeed partially explains 
discretionary authority while public and private hard information do not explain these 
deviations. The overall impact of a one deviation change of our measure of soft 
information results in a change of 16 percent of the maximum exposure of the firm. 
Finally, loans where the loan officer exerts discretion do not perform differently from 
otherwise similar loans.   





Figure 1: Customer Evaluation Form 
Loan officer use this form at the origination of the loan and at each credit revision. The loan officer collects 
the information about the firm and fills out the form to calculate the credit rating and model limit. We use 


















Figure 2: Use of Discretion in Lending 
Panel A displays a scatter plot of the lending decisions, where the model limit (i.e., the limit resulting from 
the credit scoring model) is plotted on the x-axis and the maximum exposure determined by the loan officer 











































Table I: Information Variables 
Table I presents the descriptive statistics of all the customer selections criteria. The customer selection 
criteria are divided in public information variables, private hard information, and soft information. Source 
gives the data source: Loan Officer (LO), Internal Bank Data (B), Accounting Data of the Firm (AC) or 
information from the Central Bank Credit Register (CB). Human cognition reports whether human 
cognition is required to collect the information. Obs., Mean¸ SD and Within SD are the number of 
observations, the mean, standard deviation and standard deviation within a firm. The minimum and 
maximum of each measure is 1 (bad) and 4 (good). 
 
The definitions of the bank specific variables are as follows: Previous Chapter 11 describes whether the 
firm has been involved in a Chapter 11 procedure, Central Bank Classification is the most recent credit 
rating of the firm in the credit register, the Composite Debt Index is an index on the indebtedness of the 
firm, Official Dealer measures whether the firm is an official dealer, Central Bank History Over Last 2 
Years measures the period since the last delinquency status in the credit registry and Financial Status is a 
measure of the financial health of the firm. Payment Behavior is the credit line usage and information from 
the transaction accounts of the borrower, Encumbered Assets are assets pledged as collateral and Fleet Size 
is the number of vehicles of transport companies. Company and Personal Legal History is the legal 
reputation of the firm and entrepreneur. The loan officer contacts suppliers and customers of the firm to 
collect this information. Company Personal Checkings is the judgment of the loan officer on the 
reputation and ability of the manager of the firm, based on the meetings with the manager. Overall Business 
Trend is the evaluation of the loan officer of the business plan and prospects of the firm, based on the 
meetings with the manager. Trend in Sales is the evaluation of the loan officer of the sales trend and 
prospects, based on the meetings with the manager. Quality and Reliance of Information is the evaluation 
of the loan officer of the quality of the information provided by the manager. Track Record With Main 
Suppliers is the reputation of the firm amongst the trade creditors of the firm. Importance of Brand is the 
evaluation of the loan officer of the relative importance of the brand name of the firm. Customer Business 
and Relationships is the reputation of the firm amongst its main business relationships and customers. 
 
 Obs. Source Human cognition  Classification Mean SD. 
Company and Personal Legal History 1,956 LO Yes Soft 3.79 0.53 
Company Personal Checkings 1,932 LO Yes Soft 3.79 0.57 
Overall Business Trend 262 LO Yes Soft 2.99 0.86 
Trend in Sales 901 LO Yes Soft 3.16 0.96 
Quality and Reliance of Information 1,893 LO Yes Soft 3.56 0.63 
Track Record With Main Suppliers 392 LO Yes Soft 3.91 0.30 
Importance of Brand 391 LO Yes Soft 3.91 0.34 









Table I (continued)       
  Obs. Source Human cognition Classification Mean SD. 
Payment Behavior 753 B  Private 3.76 0.58 
Price Volatility Coverage 16 B  Private 2.88 1.36 
Banking Debt With 1st Tier Banks 1,803 B  Private 3.89 0.44 
Encumbered Assets 1,842 B  Private 3.59 0.68 
Supplier Concentration 35 B  Private 3.40 0.91 
Customer Concentration 34 B  Private 3.68 0.68 
Years Relation With Main Customer 33 LO  Private 3.73 0.45 
Percent  Chattel Mortgaged 87 LO  Private 3.40 0.86 
Average Age of the Fleet  94 LO  Private 3.37 0.73 
Percent Owned Land 11 LO  Private 2.45 1.29 
Percent  Land Mortgaged 11 LO  Private 3.64 0.81 
Fleet Size  18 LO  Private 4.00 0.00 
ABF Transportation Occurrence 6 LO  Private 4.00 0.00 
Percent Cash Sales 40 LO  Private 3.03 1.17 
Facilities Ownership 40 LO  Private 2.95 1.13 
Sales Breakdown 57 LO  Private 2.54 0.78 
Monthly Sales By Vehicle 18 LO  Private 2.28 1.07 
Sales / Square Meter 12 LO  Private 2.25 0.45 
Insurance Company 20 LO  Private 3.70 0.73 
Previous Chapter 11 1,969 CB  Public 3.99 0.17 
Central Bank Classification  1,962 CB  Public 3.97 0.29 
Years in Industry 1,979 LO  Public 3.82 0.50 
Composite Debt Index 1,977 AC  Public 3.19 0.87 
Official Dealer 169 LO  Public 3.99 0.08 
Central Bank History Over Last 2 
Years 
1,952 CB  Public 3.81 0.64 
Profitability History Last 3 Years 1,897 AC  Public 3.68 0.72 
Dividend Pay-Out Ratio 894 AC  Public 3.13 1.21 
Interest Service Ratio 1,929 AC  Public 3.48 1.00 
Sales Turnover 328 AC  Public 3.11 0.96 
Financial Debt Over Fixed Assets 9 AC  Public 2.67 1.32 
Financial Status  40 AC  Public 2.85 0.86 









Table II: Summary Statistics  
Table II presents the summary statistics of the aggregate information indicators (Panel A), the correlation 
coefficients (Panel B) and the summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis (Panel C).  
 
Panel A: Aggregate Public, Private Hard and Soft Information Indicators 
We use three methods to aggregate the measures described in Appendix I. Firstly, we average the measures 
for each type (soft, private and public). Secondly, we take the minimum score for each type. Thirdly, we 
calculate the standard deviation of each measure and use the standard deviation to weight the measure in 
each information type. As sample we use all observations of the firms which never defaulted before time t, 




Obs. Mean SD. Within 
SD.   
Aggregate Indicators      
Soft Information Average 1,756 3.69 0.35 0.21 
 Minimum 1,756 3.12 0.85 0.56 
 Weighted 1,756 3.65 0.38 0.24 
Private Information Average 1,756 3.72 0.41 0.27 
 Minimum 1,756 3.39 0.84 0.54 
 Weighted 1,756 3.55 0.67 0.35 
Public Information Average 1,756 3.70 0.28 0.16 
 Minimum 1,756 2.53 1.08 0.66 
 Weighted 1,756 3.58 0.41 0.24 
Number of Information Variables       
Total number of information variables  1,756 14.12 1.82 1.10 
Number of soft information variables  1,756 3.97 1.12 0.76 
Number of private information variables  1,756 2.49 0.70 0.48 
Number of public information variables  1,756 7.66 0.89 0.59 
       
Panel B: Correlation Coefficients 
 
Average Private Information Minimum Public Information 
Average Soft Information 0.08 0.19 







Panel C: Summary statistics other variables 
 
Panel C presents the summary statistics of the lending variables, the relationship characteristics and the 
delinquency indicators and provides the mean, median and standard deviation (SD) for all 1,756 firm 
observations. The definitions of the variables can be found in Appendix I. 
 
 
Variable Obs. Mean SD. Min. Max. 
Lending variables      
Maximum Exposure ($1,000) 1,756 1215 1073 0 5961 
Model Limit ($1,000) 1,756 1242 1121 0 6774 
Positive Discretion 1,756 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Negative Discretion 1,756 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Model credit rating 1,756 2.86 0.95 1 4 
Upgrade 1,756 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Outstanding ($1,000) 1,756 358.3 606.1 0 4,998.77 
      
Relationship variables      
Inception 1,756 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Relationship Length (year) 1,756 2.57 2.43 0 32 
VIP 1,756 0.06 0.24 0 1 
      
Delinquency Indicators      
Default 1,756 0.10 0.30 0 1 







Table III: Soft Information and Loan Delinquencies 
                                              
Table III presents the results from regressions with the Delinquencyit measures Defaultit or the Loan Loss 
Provisionit as dependent variables. Pub it-1, Pri it-1, and Soft it-1 are the public, hard private, and soft 
information indicator, respectively. In addition, the specification includes 6 year dummies, 3 firm sales size 
based dummies, 31 industry dummies, 21 regional dummies, 26 loan officer dummies and information set 
dummies (which are dummy variables for each information set in the customer evaluation form). In Model 
(5) we restrict the sample to include firms with multiple lending relationships, which decreases the sample 
size to 1,490 observations. We indicate the estimation method (Probit or OLS) and report robust standard 
errors clustered on a firm level. The marginal effect of the Probit models are reported in percentage points. 






 respectively .  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable Default Default Loan Loss 
Provision 
Default Default 












 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Pri it -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 












 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Maximum exposureit / Total Assetsit    0.04  
    (0.05)  
      
Year, Firm Size, Industry, Regional and 
Information Set FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Officer FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1,756 1,756 1,756 1,756 1,490 
(Pseudo) R-sq. 0.12 0.19 0.11 0.20 0.20 







Table IV: Changes in Soft Information and Loan Delinquencies 
                                                       
Table IV presents the results from regressions with the Delinquencyit measures Defaultit or the Loan Loss 
Provisionit as dependent variables.  ΔSoftit-1, ΔPriit-1, ΔPubit-1, are the first differences of the public 
information, private information and soft information indicator, respectively. In addition, the specification 
includes 6 year dummies and the information set dummies (which are dummy variables for each 
information set in the customer evaluation form). In Model (5) we restrict the sample to firms with multiple 
lending relationships. We indicate the estimation method (Probit or OLS) and report robust standard errors 
clustered on a firm level. The marginal effect of the Probit models are reported in percentage points. 
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 (1) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: Default Loan Loss 
Provision 
Default Default 








































 (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Pri it-1 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Pubit-1 -0.02 -0.10
**
 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Maximum exposure / Total Assetsit   -0.09  
   (0.08)  
     
Year, Firm Size, Industry, Regional, 
Information Set FE. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1,141 1,141 1,141 1,000 
(Pseudo) R-sq. 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.13 







Table V: How Do Loan Officers Use Discretion? 
                                                          
Table V presents the results from regressions with the Ln Maximum Exposureit (Max Exp) as dependent variable in columns (1)-(6), positive discretionit 
in column (7) and negative discretionit in column (8). The definitions of the independent variables can be found in Appendix I. In addition, the 
specification includes 6 year dummies, 3 firm sales size based dummies, 31 industry dummies, 21 regional dummies, 26 loan officer dummies and 
information set dummies (which are dummy variables for each information set in the customer evaluation form). We estimate the regression with Probit 
and OLS and report robust standard errors clustered on a firm level. The marginal effect of the Probit models are reported in percentage points. 






 respectively.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: Max Exp Max Exp Max Exp Max Exp Max Exp Max Exp Positive Negative 
















 (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (3.37) (2.70) 
Priit 0.11 0.15 0.06 0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -7.73
**
 2.70 
 (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (3.01) (2.64) 









 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (5.05) (4.21) 
Upgradeit    0.33
***
 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.09 -6.15
**
 -0.44 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.02) (0.21) 









    (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (2.90) (2.03) 
Ln Relationship Lengthit    0.04 -0.03 -0.01 15.10
***
 2.82 
    (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (4.90) (3.20) 









    (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (4.58) (2.37) 











    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.38) (0.20) 













   (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.97) (1.12) 
             
Year, Firm Size, Industry, Regional and Information Set FE Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Approval Level FE     Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Officer FE      Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1,756 1,756 1,756 1,756 1,756 1,756   





Table VI: Discretion and Loan Delinquency 
                                          
Table VI presents the results from regressions with the Delinquencyit measures Defaultit or the Loan Loss 
Provisionit as dependent variables.  ΔSoftit-1, ΔPriit-1, ΔPubit-1, are the first differences of the public 
information, private information and soft information indicator, respectively. In addition, the specification 
includes 6 year dummies and the information set dummies (which are dummy variables for each 
information set in the customer evaluation form). We indicate the estimation method (Probit or OLS) and 
report robust standard errors clustered on a firm level. The marginal effect of the Probit models are reported 






 respectively .  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Default Default Default Loan Loss 
Provision 
Estimation Probit Probit Probit OLS 









 (0.90) (1.06) (0.99) (0.01) 









 (0.02) (1.71) (1.47) (0.023) 
Maximum exposureit  1.90
***
 0.35 0.005 
  (0.56) (0.55) (0.004) 
Model Limitit  -0.11 0.13 0.00 
  (0.41) (0.35) (0.00) 
Inceptionit   -0.61 -0.015 
   (1.52) (0.022) 





   (3.00) (0.024) 
VIPit   0.74 -0.035 
   (2.39) (0.032) 





   (0.28) (0.002) 
Year and Information Set FE. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133 




















Appendix I: Variable definitions 
 
Variable name Definition 
Average  Soft Information 
(Soft) 
Average score of the soft information variables identified in Table I. 
Average Private Information 
(Pri) 
Average score of the private information variables identified in Table I. 
Average Public Information 
(Pub) 
Average score of the public information variables identified in Table I. 
Total number of information 
variables 
Total number of information variables filled out on the customer 
selection criteria form. 
Number of soft information 
variables 
Number of soft information variables filled out on the customer 
selection criteria form. 
Number of private 
information variables 
Number of private information variables filled out on the customer 
selection criteria form. 
Number of public information 
variables 
Number of public information variables filled out on the customer 
selection criteria form. 
Maximum Exposure ($1,000) The maximum exposure to the firm determined by the loan officer at 
each credit decision. The maximum exposure is the maximum sum of 
credit lines, term loans and financial leases to the firm. 
Model Limit ($1,000) The result of the bank’s internal model. 
Positive Discretion = 1 if Maximum Exposure > Model Limit and 0 otherwise. 
Negative Discretion = 1 if Maximum Exposure < Model Limit and 0 otherwise. 
Model credit rating The minimum score of all the information variables on the customer 
selection criteria form. 
Upgrade = 1 if the loan officer upgraded the model credit rating to a higher 
credit score and 0 otherwise. 
Outstanding ($1,000) The amount of outstanding loans to the firm. 
Inception = 1 if the credit evaluation is the first evaluation of the firm. 
Relationship Length (year) Length of the lending relationship between the bank and the firm. 
VIP = 1 if the firm is an important customer for the bank. 
Default = 1 if the firm defaults within a period of one year. 




























Appendix II: Collection of Soft Information 
                                                                  
Appendix II presents the results from regressions with the                                        as 
dependent variable. The definitions of the independent variables can be found in Appendix I. In addition, 
the specification includes 6 year dummies, 3 firm sales size based dummies, 31 industry dummies, 21 
regional dummies and 26 loan officer dummies. All specifications are estimated with OLS.  Statistical 






 respectively . Standard errors are robust and 
clustered at the firm level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relationship length 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.01
*
 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) 
Inception 0.051 0.051 0.081
*
 0.029 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.033) 
Number of private information variables    -0.05
*
 
    (0.02) 
Number of public information variables    0.86
***
 
    (0.03) 
         
Year, Firm Size, Industry and Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Approval Level FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Officer FE   Yes Yes 
Obs. 1,756 1,756 1,756 1,756 








Appendix III: Correlation of Information over Time 
                                                           
Appendix III presents the results from regressions with the                         as dependent 
variable. The information indicators are the levels of the average soft, private and public indicators in 
columns (1)-(3) respectively and the first differences of the average soft, private and public indicators in 
columns (4)-(5) respectively. The definitions of the independent variables can be found in Appendix I. In 
addition, the specification includes 6 year dummies, 3 firm sales size based dummies, 31 industry dummies, 
21 regional dummies, 26 loan officer dummies. The sample reduces to 1,133 because of the exclusion of 
the first observation of each firm. All specifications are estimated with OLS.  Statistical significance at 






 respectively . Standard errors are robust and clustered at the 
firm level.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 





   
 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)    
Priit-1 -0.03 0.39
***
 0.02   
 





    
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)    





    (0.02) (0.03)  





    (0.03)  (0.02) 





     (0.04) (0.02) 
Year, Firm Size, 
Industry, Regional, 
Loan Officer FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Obs. 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133 
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